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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The goal of economic theory is to provide a systematic explanation of 
the actions of economic agents and institutions within an economy, and to 
explain the overall operation of an economy. How an economy functions may 
be examined from the standpoint of an isolated economy or an economy that 
exists in a global setting. 
Economic theory often develops in response to questions of real-world 
importance. Early economic theory developed, in part, from attempts to 
answer two questions relating to the functioning of economies in an inter­
national context. The first question concerned why trade occurs and how 
the gains from trade are distributed between nations. The second question 
concerned how overall economic performance in one country is linked to the 
level of economic activity in other countries. 
Early attempts to explain basic economic relationships often 
generated more questions regarding how economies function. As economic 
theory became more sophisticated, so too did the real-world questions that 
economists were called upon to answer. 
Changes in the economic framework often generate new sets of ques­
tions that change the focus of economic theory. For instance, the switch 
to flexible exchange rates in 1974 by the major industrial nations sparked 
interest in the question of how the relative values of currencies are 
determined. Since then a major focus of international economists has been 
the construction of economic models that explain exchange rate movements. 
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Changes in social values may also affect the type of questions that 
are directed toward economists. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
environmental quality became an important concern in the industrialized 
nations. Economists responded to the new questions that were being raised 
about environmental quality. Less attention was placed on simply deter­
mining how the maximum output could be achieved from a given resource 
base. More time and effort was devoted to developing models that 
explained the relationships between levels of economic activity and 
environmental quality. Attention was focused on constructing models that 
allowed a systematic accounting of the costs and benefits associated with 
given levels of environmental quality. 
Regardless of the type of questions that economists are called to 
answer, economic investigation follows a common procedure. An economist 
begins by specifying a set of assumptions that are relevant to the ques­
tion or issue that has been raised. The assumptions reflect the 
economist's view of the world. From the set of assumptions, the economist 
derives testable hypotheses. The empirical validity of the hypotheses is 
then determined through the application of appropriate empirical 
methodology. 
The nature of the subject matter usually prohibits economists from 
conducting controlled experiments. Therefore, economists are limited to 
considering only some of the relevant variables. Results are often 
subject to differing interpretations, and single empirical tests are 
rarely conclusive. A theory is widely accepted only when a large body of 
evidence exists which supports the theory. Likewise, established theory 
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is discarded only in the face of a substantial amount of empirical 
evidence that is inconsistent with the theory. 
Even as economic understanding increases, real-world questions often 
remain only partially answered. Today, economists are still trying to 
explain why trade occurs and how economic activity in one country is 
linked to levels of economic activity in other countries. Given the 
inability to conduct controlled experiments, it may be that the best that 
economics can do is to determine which answers are clearly false. 
Knowing which answers are false and which policies will not work, is 
important to citizens and policymakers. Therefore, economists continue to 
attempt to answer questions and to advance the limits of economic knowl­
edge. Progress is made through the combined efforts of many economists. 
Explanation of Thesis/Dissertation Format 
This dissertation consists of three essays in international and 
intraregional economics. Each essay represents an attempt to answer a 
specific question that arose as the result of changes in the economic 
framework and in social values that occurred in the early 1970s. Each 
essay is an original paper written by the candidate and each is presented 
in a separate section. 
The study presented in the first section represents an attempt to 
answer the question of whether monetary variability influences the rela­
tive value of a currency. The answer is important because revealed theory 
has led economists to focus attention on the relative levels of money 
supplies as a significant determinant of the exchange rate. If monetary 
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variability does influence the exchange rate, then economists should 
consider relative monetary variability as well as relative money 
supplies when making exchange rate predictions. 
The study presented in the second section consists of an attempt to 
explain how the Eurodollar market functions. It is important to determine 
how the Eurodollar market operates in order to answer the question 
concerning whether the Eurodollar market is a source of global inflation. 
If the Eurodollar market is capable of creating credit through multiple 
deposit expansion, then it may be partially responsible for the surge in 
world inflation in the 1970s, and it may represent a potential source of 
world monetary instability. 
The study presented in the third section consists of an attempt to 
assess the impact of nonpoint source pollution control policy in the 
presence of alternative energy price regimes. The answers provided by 
the study may prove useful to policymakers as they attempt to select 
appropriate pollution control policies. 
The same general procedure is followed in each section. First, the 
problem is presented and the relevant literature is reviewed. Second, the 
model used to analyze the problem is developed. Third, the results of 
tests of the model are presented. Finally, inferences from the study are 
drawn, and suggestions for additional studies are given. 
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SECTION I. THE IMPACT OF MONETARY VARIABILITY ON 
EXCHANGE RATES UNDER A REGIME OF GENERALIZED 
FLOATING: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
The switch to generalized floating of exchange rates in 1974 
generated renewed interest in the theory of exchange rate determination. 
One theory advanced to explain exchange rate movements was the monetary 
theory. The monetary theory of exchange rate determination was an exten­
sion to flexible exchange rates of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments which was developed in modern form by Jacob Frenkel and Harry 
Johnson and others (10). 
The monetary approach to exchange rate determination views the 
exchange rate as the relative price of two national moneys. Thus, the 
equilibrium exchange rate between two currencies depends on the willing­
ness of economic agents to hold the actual supplies of each currency. 
Although relative supplies of and demands for money are the proximate 
determinants of an exchange rate, the monetary approach does not ignore 
the impact of real factors on the value of a currency. Rather, the 
monetary approach proposes that real factors exert their influence on an 
exchange rate through monetary channels. 
A typical exchange rate determination equation developed from the 
monetary approach would show the relative value of a currency to be depen­
dent on relative money supplies, relative real income, and relative 
nominal interest rates. Attempts to establish the empirical validity of 
the monetary approach have met with mixed success. 
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Recently, studies by Lapan and Enders (15) and King, Putnam, and 
Wilford (14) have suggested that the relative variability of money 
supplies will also affect the exchange rate. These studies reach opposite 
conclusions, however, regarding the impact of greater monetary variability 
on the relative value of a currency. Lapan and Enders maintain that an 
increase in the variance of a national money supply will appreciate that 
country's currency. King, Putnam, and Wilford contend that an increase in 
monetary variability in a country will depreciate that country's 
currency. 
The purpose of this study is to empirically assess the impact of 
monetary variability on an exchange rate. The study will be conducted 
within the general framework of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination, and it will focus on the United States/Canada exchange rate 
during the period from 1974 to 1979. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The monetary approach to exchange rate determination emphasizes that 
an exchange rate is the relative price of two national moneys, and that 
the equilibrium exchange rate is achieved when the existing stocks of the 
two moneys are willingly held (9). Therefore, the monetary approach 
focuses attention on the determinants of the supply and demand for money 
in its explanation of exchange rate adjustment. 
The monetary approach posits the existence of a demand for money that 
is a stable function of a few variables. Belief in the monetary approach 
does not necessitate the acceptance of one particular functional form for 
the demand for money, but a form commonly employed in empirical tests of 
the monetary approach is: 
f = CGY ^e ^ , (1) 
where 
M = the nominal stock of money demanded; 
P = the price level; 
Y = the level of real income; 
I = the nominal rate of interest; and 
CQ, Cg, and c^ = parameters. 
If equation (1) gives the domestic demand for money, then the demand 
for money in a foreign country can be represented as: 
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(2) 
with the asterisks denoting foreign variables. Real income is assumed to 
be exogenous, and changes in nominal interest rates are assumed primarily 
to reflect exogenous movements in the expected rate of inflation (3). The 
monetary approach also assumes that purchasing power parity will hold 
between the two countries so that: 
with S representing the spot price of foreign currency in terms of 
domestic currency. 
When exchange rates are flexible the money supply in each country is 
exogenous so equations (1) and (2) determine the price levels. That is, 
prices adjust in each country to equate the stock demand for money with 
the actual supply. Equation (3) indicates that the exchange rate adjusts 
to equalize the purchasing power of both currencies expressed in a common 
unit. 
The exchange rate determination equation is derived by taking 
logarithms of all three equations and substituting equations (1) and (2) 
into equation (3). After rearranging, the resulting equation is; 
P = SP* ( 3 )  
ln(S) = -ln(cQ) + InCbg) + ln(M) - ln(M*) - CglnCY) 
+ bglnCY*) + c^I - bgl*. ( 4 )  
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Assuming that = bg, Cg = bg, and = b^, equation (4) can be expressed 
as: 
s = ln(S) ; 
m = ln(M/M*); 
y = ln(Y/Y*); and 
DI = (I - I*). 
According to the monetary approach, an increase in the domestic money 
supply would tend to cause an excess supply of domestic money, resulting 
in an increase in domestic prices and an increase in the exchange rate (a 
depreciation). An increase in domestic real income would cause an 
increase in the domestic demand for money which would be met by a decrease 
in domestic prices and the exchange rate if it was not satisfied by 
domestic monetary expansion. Likewise, with all other variables constant 
an increase in domestic nominal interest rates would cause a decrease in 
the demand for money and an increase in prices and the exchange rate. 
In stochastic form, equation (5) would be: 
s = m - c^y + CgDI (5) 
with 
( 6 )  
The monetary approach implies that ct^ and are greater than zero and 
that âg is less than zero. Specifically, should not be significantly 
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different than one and should not be significantly different than zero. 
Also, âg represents the (negative) income elasticity of the demand for 
money and represents the (negative) interest semielasticity of the 
demand for money. 
The monetary approach can be tested either through direct estimation 
of the exchange rate determination equation or through tests of the 
assumptions (such as purchasing power parity) of the monetary approach 
(1). The following discussion will focus on direct tests of the monetary 
approach. Unless otherwise stated, it should be understood that the tests 
utilized ordinary least squares estimation techniques. 
Tests of the monetary approach were conducted by Humphrey and Lawler 
(13) for the United States/United Kingdom exchange rate and for the United 
States/Italy exchange rate. Ml for each country was used in the 
estimations for the money supply variables, and real gross national 
product for the United States and real gross domestic product for the 
United Kingdom and Italy were used for the income variables. Treasury 
bill rates for each country were employed in the United States/United 
Kingdom equation, and the rates on medium-term government bonds were 
employed in the United States/Italy equation. Results for each equation 
were obtained using 18 quarterly observations of the variables from the 
first quarter of 1973 to the second quarter of 1977. Empirical estimates 
for the dollar/pound exchange rate were; 
s = 3.47 + .55m - 1.39y + .22i, 
(3.84) (4.00) (3.47) 
( 7 )  
D.W. = 1.63, R = .94 
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and estimates derived for the dollar/lira exchange rate were: 
s = -4.05 + .89m - .58y + .131, (8) 
(4.98) (1.56) (1.85) 
D.W. = 1.03, = .95 
with 1 = ln(I/I*) and all other variables defined as for equation (5). 
The terms in parentheses represent the t-values of the estimated coeffi­
cients . 
The results for both equations are generally supportive of the 
monetary approach, although the coefficients on the United States/Italy 
income and interest rate variables are not statistically significant. 
Humphrey and Lawler also tested the United States/United Kingdom exchange 
rate equation using quarterly observations from the first quarter of 1920 
to the fourth quarter of 1924. The results of the estimation for the 
early 1920s are consistent with the monetary approach except that the 
coefficient on the income variable is positive and not statistically 
significant. Humphrey and Lawler did not report the results of any other 
estimations, but they did admit that attempts to test the monetary 
approach for other countries using recent data did not yield results as 
supportive as those for the dollar/pound and dollar/lira exchange rates. 
Bllson (2) found strong support for the general monetary approach in 
a test of the mark/pound exchange rate for the period from June 1970 to 
August 1977. Bilson used monthly values of West German M2 and United 
Kingdom M3 for the money supply variables, and values for each country of 
the seasonally adjusted index of industrial production for the real income 
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variables. The interest rate differential was proxied by the one-month 
forward premium (FP).^ When two-stage least squares techniques were 
utilized to estimate a monetary model that was composed of an exchange 
rate determination equation, a price adjustment equation, and an interest 
rate differential equation, the following results for the first equation 
were obtained : 
s = 1.264m - 1.385y + 11.376FP - .425d + 2.027DU, (9) 
(14.9) (7.1) (3.8) (3.0) (5.3) 
D.W. = 1.651, R^(adj.) = .995. 
Bilson estimated equation (9) using a weighted Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation of his original equation. An intercept term was included 
in the estimated equation but its value was not reported. 
In an attempt to determine the extent of deviations from purchasing 
power parity, Bilson included the "d" variable in the estimated equation. 
Bilson set "d" equal to (ln(P/P*) - ln(S)) with P and P* proxied by the 
consumer price index for each country. A value significantly different 
than zero suggests purchasing power parity did not hold completely for the 
two countries during the study period. The DU term represents a dummy 
variable that reflects the impact on the demand for sterling of oil 
revenue deposits in London. The dummy variable had an initial value of 
.15 in January 1974 and declined exponentially thereafter. 
^In a related study, Bilson (3) found treasury bill rate differen­
tials to be empirically less satisfactory than the forward exchange 
premium. 
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Frankel (8) analyzed the mark/dollar exchange rate between July 1974 
and February 1978 using a modified version of the monetary approach. In 
his estimation, Frankel utilized monthly values of seasonally adjusted Ml 
for the money supply variables, and monthly values of the seasonally 
adjusted index of industrial production for the income variables. He 
employed short-term interest differentials as well as long-term interest 
differentials in the exchange rate determination equation. Three-month 
money market rates were used for the short-term interest differential, and 
long-term government bond rates were used for the long-term differential. 
The long-term bond rate differential was seen as a proxy for the expected 
long-run inflation differential. Frankel included both interest rate 
differentials to capture the short-run liquidity effects and long-run 
inflationary effects of a change in monetary policy. When instrumental 
variables for the expected inflation differential were employed in the 
estimation, and a Fair-type (7) technique was used to correct for first-
order serial correlation, the following estimates were derived; 
e = 1.39 + .97m - .52y - 5.40DI + 29.40DlJ^. (10) 
((.12))((.21)) ((.22))((2.04)T ((3.33)) 
Terms in double parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients, 
and Dig and DI^ represent the short-term and long-term interest rate 
differentials. The results support the monetary approach since all 
coefficients are significant, carry the anticipated signs, and have values 
1 9 
An R and Durbin-Watson were not reported for this estimate. 
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that are plausible. The results also support the view that when the 
variation in the inflation differential between countries is moderate 
(like that for Germany and the United States), the exchange rate will be 
negatively related to the short-term nominal interest differential, but 
positively related to the anticipated long-run inflation differential. 
Dornbusch (6) found little support for the monetary approach in a 
similar test of the dollar/mark exchange rate for the period from the 
second quarter of 1973 to the fourth quarter of 1979. To estimate the 
exchange rate determination equation, Dornbusch employed quarterly values 
of seasonally adjusted Ml for the money supply variables, and seasonally 
adjusted gross national product measured at 1975 prices for the income 
variables. Dornbusch included interest rate differentials for both short-
term and long-term rates in the exchange rate equation. Rates on 
representative money-market instruments were used for the short-term 
interest rate variables, and rates on domestic government bonds were used 
for the long-term interest rate variables. The exchange rate equation was 
estimated in a number of forms, but the results for the basic equation 
were: 
s = 5.76 - .03m - 1.05y + .OlDl + .04DI , (11) 
(2.81) (-.07) (-.97) (1.90) (2.07J 
D.W. = 1.83, = .33. 
These results indicate that the monetary approach is an inadequate theory 
of exchange rate determination for the dollar/mark rate. Neither the 
coefficient on the money supply term, or the coefficient on the income 
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term are significant. In addition, the sign of the coefficient on the 
2 
money supply term is negative, and R is rather low. 
Frenkel (9) tested the empirical validity of the monetary approach 
for the period in the 1920s when exchange rates were flexible. He 
estimated exchange rate determination equations for the franc/pound and 
franc/dollar exchange rates using monthly data from February 1921 to May 
1925. He employed the Theil-Goldberger mixed-estimation procedure (19) 
with stochastic restrictions to derive estimates for the franc/pound 
equation : 
s = .001 + .9991n(M) - .9721n(M*) + .1881n(Y) 
((.010)) ((.099)) ((.099)) ((.281)) 
+ .9261n(Y*) + 3.914FP, (12) 
((.520)) ((.970)), 
D.W. = 1.86, = .92 
and for the franc/dollar equation: 
s = .006 + .9951n(M) - .9951n(M*) + .2251n(Y*) 
((.Oil)) ((.099)) ((.100)) ((.327)) 
- .3691n(Y*) + 3.971FP, (13) 
((.370)) ((.974)) 
D.W. = 1.81, R^ = .86. 
As before, the terms in double parentheses are the standard errors of the 
coefficients, FP represents the forward premium on foreign exchange, and 
the other variables are defined as in equations (1) and (2). None of the 
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coefficients on the income terms is significant and, with the exception of 
foreign income in equation (12), none of the income coefficients have the 
anticipated signs. All of the other coefficients are significant and have 
the anticipated signs and values. 
Clements and Frenkel (5) estimated an exchange rate determination 
equation for the dollar/pound exchange rate for the same time period in 
the 1920s. Employing an iterative Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, they derived 
the following estimates; 
= -4.297 + .4151n ( + 1.0501n(M) - .0441n(M*) 
((1.396)) ((.099)) r ^  ((.182)) ((.143)) 
+ 188y + .363DI, (14) 
((.066)) ((.350)) 
D.W. = 1.55, = .96. 
The and terms represent the prices of traded and nontraded goods in 
the United States. 
The results give only limited support to the monetary approach. The 
coefficients on the relative price structure term and the U.S. money 
supply variable are significant and have the expected signs. However, the 
coefficients on the United Kingdom money supply variable and the interest 
rate differential are not significant. The coefficient on the relative 
income term is statistically significant but it carries a positive sign 
rather than the anticipated negative sign. 
Frenkel (9) also estimated a mark/pound exchange rate equation for 
the period of German hyperinflation in the 1920s. Frenkel assumed that 
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changes in the German money supply during the period of hyperinflation 
would dominate changes in real income and changes in the British money 
supply, so the latter terms were not included in the estimated equation. 
Likewise, he assumed that the interest rate differential would be 
dominated by expectations of German inflation so the forward premium on 
pounds was employed as a proxy for expectations of future inflation. 
Frenkel used two-stage least squares following Fair's method to estimate 
the mark/pound exchange rate for the period from February 1921 to August 
1923. The resulting estimates were: 
s = -6.030 + .9701n(M) + 3.886FP, (15) 
((1.696)) ((.092)) ((1.131)) 
D.W. = 2.56, = .99. 
The estimates are strongly supportive of the monetary approach. All 
of the coefficients are significant, the value of the coefficient on the 
German money supply variable is close to one, and the semielasticity of 
the FP term is similar in magnitude to previous estimates of the interest 
rate semielasticity of the demand for money. 
Recent studies by King, Putnam, and Wilford (14) and Lapan and Enders 
(15) have expanded the basic monetary approach by showing that the 
variance of a country's money supply, as well as the level of that money 
supply, will be important determinants of the relative value of that 
currency. However, the studies reach differing conclusions as to the 
effect of increased monetary variability on a country's exchange rate. 
King, Putnam, and Wilford suggest that an increase in the variance of a 
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country's money supply will cause a depreciation of that country's 
currency, and Lapan and Enders show that an Increase In monetary varia­
bility will cause an appreciation of a country's currency. 
King, Putnam, and Wilford develop a portfolio adjustment model in 
which economic agents hold foreign currencies as well as domestic currency 
in order to satisfy their demand for monetary services. The elasticity of 
currency substitution in real money demand depends on the degree of 
integration of world goods and capital markets. Actual currency substitu­
tion within a portfolio of currencies occurs with changes in exchange rate 
expectations and with changes in the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
those expectations. 
King, Putnam, and Wilford propose that an increase in the variance of 
the domestic money supply will cause an increase in the uncertainty 
associated with expectations of the future value of the domestic currency. 
Even though the exchange value of any particular foreign currency is 
simultaneously becoming more uncertain with respect to the home currency, 
it is assumed that the exchange value of the foreign currency Is unchanged 
in its perceived variability with respect to other foreign currencies. 
Therefore, a risk-averse economic agent will reduce the total variance of 
his or her portfolio by decreasing domestic currency holdings. The 
portfolio shift away from domestic currency will lead to exchange rate 
depreciation. King, Putnam, and Wilford believe that increased monetary 
variability will also increase the need to monitor exchange rates and, 
thereby, raise the cost of holding the domestic currency in the port­
folio. 
19 
Lapan and Enders develop a two-country, overlapping generations loan 
consumption model that explicitly shows how aggregate money and commodity 
demands arise from the optimizing behavior of economic agents who have 
rational expectations. Individuals are assumed to live for two periods. 
The first time period is a work period, the second is a retirement period. 
Commodities are assumed to be perishable so retired individuals live from 
accumulated currency holdings. First-generation individuals determine 
first-period consumption and currency holdings based on current and 
expected future prices. Since it is assumed that individuals are free to 
hold currency from either country and that explicit transactions demands 
do not exist for either currency, individuals must determine the composi­
tion as well as the level of their currency portfolio holdings. Lapan and 
Enders show that if economic agents assign a zero weight to the proba­
bility of capital controls, then the ratio of foreign currency to domestic 
currency in portfolios will be determined by the distributions of the 
money supplies (as long as output disturbances are not correlated with 
money supplies). 
One of the important implications of the Lapan and Enders model is 
that in the presence of uncertainty about currency supplies, the equilib­
rium exchange rate will depend on relative money supplies and on the means 
and variances of the distributions of the money supplies. In particular, 
an increase in the variance of the domestic money supply will cause an 
appreciation of the domestic currency as long as economic agents are not 
very risk averse. 
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Within the context of the model, greater variability of the domestic 
money supply will cause greater variability of real income associated with 
holdings of the domestic currency. If individuals are not too risk 
averse, the increased variability of real income will lead to an increase 
in expected utility. Individuals will accentuate the risk, then, by 
increasing their holdings of the domestic currency which will cause the 
currency to appreciate. The result is another application of the 
principle that some individuals may benefit from price variability. 
The Lapan and Enders model and the King, Putnam, and Wilford model 
both imply the existence of an exchange rate determination equation that 
has the same general form as one developed within the monetary approach, 
and in addition has the relative variance of national money supplies as an 
argument. In the next section, an exchange rate determination equation 
will be presented which is consistent with the monetary approach but which 
includes money supply variability as an argument. 
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MODEL 
By modifying equation (5), an exchange rate determination equation 
can be developed which is suggestive of the ones implied by the Lapan and 
Enders study and by the King, Putnam, and Wilford study. Letting V 
represent domestic monetary variability and V* represent foreign monetary 
variability, a modified version of the exchange rate equation would be: 
s = m - c^y + CgDl - c^V + b^V*. (16) 
Equation (16) reflects the Lapan and Enders hypothesis if the 
parameters c^ and b^ are greater than zero, and it reflects the King, 
Putnam, and Wilford hypothesis if c^ and b^ are less than zero. The 
modified exchange rate equation is generally consistent with the type of 
exchange rate determination equations implied by both studies. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that the exchange rate determination 
equation presented by King, Putnam, and Wilford is based on an aggregate 
money demand function that is specified a priori. The exchange rate 
equation developed by Lapan and Enders is derived from a utility-
maximizing microeconomlc foundation. In addition, in the context of the 
Lapan and Enders model, V and V* should be interpreted as unanticipated 
monetary variability. 
Neither Lapan and Enders or King, Putnam, and Wilford assign much 
Importance to relative real income as a determinant of the exchange rate. 
In the Lapan and Enders model, output uncertainty will not affect the 
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currency composition of portfolio holdings as long as output disturbances 
are not correlated with the money supply. 
The King, Putnam, and Wilford model implies that it may not be 
possible to specify a priori the effect of a change in real income on the 
exchange rate. If economic agents hold many different currencies, an 
increase in real income in one country may cause an increase in demand for 
all of the currencies held. The ultimate effect on the exchange rate will 
depend on the responsiveness of the currency composition of money port­
folios to the change in real income. 
Lapan and Enders also downplay the importance of nominal interest 
rate differentials as determinants of the relative value of a currency. 
This follows from the assumption in their model that money is the only 
store of value. 
Estimation of a modified version of the exchange rate determination 
equation should provide a means of determining the effect of monetary 
variability on relative currency values. Since it is not possible to 
specify "the" variance of a money supply at each moment in time, it seems 
reasonable to view V and V* as the expected domestic and foreign monetary 
variability. Before developing proxies for V and V*, it is necessary to 
specify assumptions regarding how individuals form expectations of 
monetary variability. 
One possible assumption is that in the period after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, individuals were not sure that the money supply 
process would be stable. If the money supply process is not stable over 
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time, then the best estimate of current monetary variability might be the 
variance of the money supply during a recent period. 
Another possible assumption is that individuals believed that the 
money supply process would be stable under a regime of flexible exchange 
rates. If the money supply process was perceived as stable, then 
individuals would use all available observations during the flexible rate 
period in forming their expectations. A proxy for expected monetary 
variability at a particular point in time might be the actual variance of 
the money supply from the beginning of the flexible rate period to that 
particular point. 
A final assumption is that Individuals have accurate knowledge of the 
money supply process, but not the variance of the process. Then, an 
appropriate proxy for V and V* might be the variance of the forecast 
errors that arise from the use of the true model of the money supply 
process. Expectations of monetary variability at a point in time might be 
the actual variance of the forecast errors from the beginning of the 
flexible rate period to that point in time. 
The first assumption, then, is that individuals do not have informa­
tion about the stability of the money supply process. The second assump­
tion is that individuals perceive that the money supply process is stable 
but do not know the process. The third assumption is that individuals 
know the underlying process that generates the money supply but not its 
variance. 
The next section presents the results of estimates of exchange rate 
determination equations for the U.S. dollar/Canadian dollar exchange rate. 
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The results of regressions using each of the three classes of proxies are 
reported in separate subsections along with a description of how each 
proxy was constructed. 
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RESULTS 
The United States/Canada exchange rate equations were estimated in 
the form; 
S - »0t + 8lt»t - * «ôtn + "t <"> 
with all variables defined as in equations (1), (2), (5), and (16). All 
equations were estimated using quarterly data for the period from the 
first quarter of 1974 through the fourth quarter of 1979. All regressions 
were made using ordinary least squares techniques. 
In other studies of the monetary approach, researchers have employed 
both seasonally adjusted money aggregates and seasonally unadjusted 
aggregates. Hodrick (12) believes that seasonally unadjusted money 
supplies should be used in estimating exchange rate determination equa­
tions. According to his argument, central banks may recognize that the 
demand for money has a seasonal component, and they may adjust their money 
supplies to compensate for the seasonal change in demand for money. If 
such an adjustment is made by central banks, then the seasonally 
unadjusted money stocks would correspond more closely to the true money 
demand functions, and hence to the exchange rate. On the other hand, 
rational agents may discount the seasonal component of the money supply in 
which case seasonally adjusted monetary aggregates should be used in 
estimating exchange rate equations. 
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Most of the equations in this study were estimated using both 
seasonally adjusted and unadjusted Ml. The results usually did not 
indicate a clear-cut superiority of one or the other so the estimates are 
presented for both. 
United States gross national product measured in 1972 dollars, and 
Canadian gross national product measured in 1971 Canadian dollars were 
used for the real income variables. Representative money market rates 
were used for the nominal interest rate variables. Proxies for V and V* 
were based on assumptions regarding how economic agents form expectations 
of monetary variability. 
Money supply, income, and exchange rate data were drawn from 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development publications (11, 
17). Interest rate data was obtained from Morgan Guaranty publications 
(20). All observations were at or near the end of the quarter. 
Before reviewing specific results, a number of points should be made. 
The first is that the estimates were supportive of the monetary approach 
with the exception that the sign of the estimated coefficient on "I" was 
negative (in every equation in which the coefficient was significant). 
Also, the sign of the estimated coefficient on I* was positive. These 
results indicate that an increase in U.S. (Canadian) nominal interest 
rates will cause an appreciation (depreciation) of the exchange rate. 
This is contrary to the expectations of the general monetary approach but 
is consistent with Frankel's (8) version. 
The explanation for the results lies in the fact that the U.S. and 
Canadian economies are highly integrated, and the variation in the 
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inflation differential between the two countries is relatively small (8). 
If inflationary expectations are similar, then the nominal interest rate 
differential will reflect differences in real interest rates. Higher real 
interest rates in the U.S. will induce short-term capital inflows which 
will tend to appreciate the exchange rate. 
The second point that should be made is that the Durbin-Watson 
statistic for each regression lies in its indeterminant range. A 
convenient method for determining whether autocorrelation is serious in 
regressions with small samples has been suggested by Rao and Griliches 
(18). They propose that for sample sizes of 20 it is not necessary to 
correct for autocorrelation as long as the estimated first-order auto­
correlation coefficient is less than .30 (16). Using that as a rough 
guide, only equation (24) is suspect. For each regression other than 
equation (24), the estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient (not 
reported) is less than .30. The first-order autocorrelation coefficient 
estimated for equation (24) is .306. However, when the ordinary least 
squares residuals for equation (24) were regressed on their one-period 
lagged values, the t-value of the autocorrelation coefficient was not 
significant even at the .10 significance level. 
Finally, it should be noted that an F-test of the joint hypothesis 
that the intercept is not sign'ficantly different than zero and the value 
of the coefficient on the money supply variable is not significantly 
different than one was conducted for each regression. An F-statlstlc 
larger than the .05 significance value would indicate that the joint 
hypothesis should be rejected. The F-statlstlc for the estimated 
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equations was larger than its critical value only for equations (20), 
(24), and (28). 
Results for the First Class of Proxies 
The first class of proxies for V and V* to be employed in the regres­
sions were developed on the assumption that economic agents form expecta­
tions regarding monetary variability based on recent variability. A proxy 
that was used for expected monetary variability at the end of each quarter 
was the normalized standard deviation of the past six monthly values of 
the money supply. The normalized standard deviations of the past nine, 
and the past twelve, monthly values of the money supply were also employed 
in alternate estimates of the exchange rate determination equation. 
Table I-l gives the results of the regressions. 
The variables NS, NN, and NT represent the normalized standard devia­
tion of the past six, nine, and twelve monthly values of the U.S. money 
2 
supply. The "F" listed beside R in each equation gives the value of the 
F-statistic for that equation. A superscript "A" indicates that 
seasonally adjusted money supply values were used in that equation. 
Equation (18) gives results that are strongly supportive of the Lapan 
and Enders version of the monetary approach. The coefficients on the 
monetary variability proxies are significant and have the signs predicted 
by the Lapan and Enders model. The coefficient on relative money supplies 
is strongly significant and close to its expected value of one. The 
estimated coefficient on the U.S. interest rate variable is significant 
and is plausible as a value of the interest semielasticity of the demand 
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Table I-l. Results when monetary variability for each quarter is proxied 
by the normalized standard deviation of the money supply 
during the previous six, nine, or twelve months^ 
s = -.30 + .92m - .91y - 1.501 + .521* - 7.15NS + 1.76NS* (18) 
(-.19) (6.05) (-1.65)(-2.42) (.79) (-3.30) (2.55) 
D.W. = 1.48, = .896, F = .62, SEE = .0129 
s = -.03 + .80m - .89y - 1.451 + .741* - 5.39NN + 1.23NN* (19) 
(-.02) (3.85) (-1.37)(-2.03) (.99) (-2.10) (1.27) 
D.W. = 1.54, R2 = .867, F = 1.12, SEE = .0165 
s = -1.64 + .77m - .17y - 1.961 + 1.321* - 6.83NT + .40NT* (20) 
(-.81) (5.02) (-.23) (-2.74) (1.71) (-2.85) (.54) 
D.W. = 1.39, = .877, F = 3.99, SEE = .0152 
s = -1.08 + 1.07m^ - .8Iy - 2.301 + 1.631* - .97NS^ + .54NS'^* (21) 
(-.57) (5.25) (-1.31) (-3.17) (2.30) (-.33) (.67) 
D.W. = 1.75, R2 = .887, SEE = .0140 
^An F-test was not performed for equation (21). 
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for money. Multiplying the coefficient on "I" by its mean value over the 
sample period (.08) gives an interest rate elasticity of .12. The 
estimated coefficients on relative income and the Canadian interest rate 
are not significant at the .05 level. 
Equations (19) and (20) were estimated using nine-month and twelve­
month proxies for monetary variability. The results for both equations 
are similar to those for equation (18) except that the coefficients on NN* 
and NT* are not significant. In addition, the coefficient on the U.S. 
interest rate variable in equation (19) is significant only at the .06 
significance level. Equation (19) is especially interesting in terms of 
the Lapan and Enders model since the results for (19) imply that the 
exchange rate is determined only by relative money supplies and U.S. 
monetary variability. 
In this set of estimates, the seasonally unadjusted money supply data 
yielded better results than the seasonally adjusted values. When season­
ally adjusted data were employed in the regressions, none of the monetary 
variability proxies was significant at the .05 level. Equation (21) is 
listed for comparison purposes with equation (18). The other estimates 
are not reported. 
Assuming that expectations regarding monetary variability are based 
on recent monetary variability, an alternative proxy might be the variance 
of the rate of growth of the money supply over a recent period of time. 
Table 1-2 gives the results of regressions that were performed using the 
variance of the rate of growth of the money supply over the past six. 
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Table 1-2. Results when monetary variability for each quarter is proxied 
by the variance of the rate of growth of the money supply 
during the previous six, nine, or twelve months 
s = 1.82 + .72m - 1.61y - 1.261 + .921* - 40.94VS + 10.29VS* (22) 
(.81) (3.42) (-2.16) (-1.24) (.91) (-.70) (.32) 
D.W. = 1.56, = .822, F = .95, SEE = .0220 
s = 2.90 + .60m - 1.92y - .541 + .321* - 97.82VN + 56.59VN* (23) 
(1.40) (2.70) (-2.84) (-.52) (.32) (-.86) (1.44) 
D.W. = 1.59, R^ = .837, F = 1.64, SEE = .0202 
s = 2.17 + .35m - 1.28y + .041 + .281* - 607.48VT + 47.79VT* (24) 
(1.35) (1.77) (-2.24) (.05) (.38) (-3.04) (1.21) 
D.W. = 1.36, = .887, F = 5.85, SEE = .0140 
s = .33 + .92m^ - 1.23y - 1.821 + 1.261* - 989.64VS^ + 36.81VS^* (25) 
(.20) (5.19) (-2.24) (-2.74) (1.84) (-1.68) (.90) 
D.W. = 1.84, = .901, F = .13, SEE = .0122 
s = -.21 + .94m^ - 1.02y - 1.921 + 1.331* - 866.99VN^ + 61.83VN^* (26) 
(-.10) (4.37) (-1.49) (-2.78) (1.82) (-.94) (.92) 
D.W. = 1.71, R2 = .894, F = .22, SEE = .0132 
8 = -2.47 + 1.08m^ - .24y - 2.211 + 1.181* - 735.92VT^ 
(-.93) (4.71) (-.26) (-3.45) (1.39) (-.57) 
+ 164.38VT^* (27) 
(1.49) 
D.W. = 1.54, = .901, F = .81, SEE =• .0123 
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nine, and twelve months as proxies for the end-of-quarter expected 
monetary variability. 
The variables VS, VN, and VT represent the variance of the past six, 
nine, and twelve monthly growth rates for the U.S. money supply. In 
general, the results are not as strong when the variance of the growth 
rate is used as a proxy. 
None of the interest rate variables or monetary variability proxies 
in equations (22) and (23) are statistically significant. The coefficient 
on VT in equation (24) is significant, but the coefficient on relative 
money supplies in (24) rather low, and is significant only at the .10 
significance level. The coefficient on relative income is significant in 
each of the three equations. 
The use of seasonally adjusted money supply data does not improve the 
results with respect to the monetary variability proxies. The t-value for 
VS in equation (25) indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 
.12 level. The t-values for the other money supply proxies in equations 
(25), (26), and (27) are even lower. 
The major difference between equations (22)-(24) and equations (25)-
(27) is that the coefficient on the U.S. interest rate variable is 
significant in each of the latter three equations. The estimated coeffi­
cient on the U.S. interest rate variable in equations (25), (26), and (27) 
implies an interest rate elasticity of .15 for equations (25) and (26), 
and an elasticity of .18 for equation (27). Also, the coefficient on 
relative income is not significant in equations (26) and (27). 
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Results for the Second Class of Proxies 
Alternate assumptions regarding how individuals view the money supply 
process lead to different proxies for expected monetary variability. If 
individuals believe the money supply process is stable, but do not know 
the process that generates the money supply, then they may make use of all 
observations of the money supply in forming their views of monetary 
variability. Under this assumption, a proxy for monetary variability 
might be the normalized standard deviation of all past values of the money 
supply from the beginning of the flexible rate period to the current 
period. 
Somewhat arbitrarily, March 1973 was chosen as the start of the study 
period. Therefore, the value of the proxy for expected monetary 
variability at the end of the first quarter of 1974 was the normalized 
standard deviation of the monthly values of the money supply from March 
1973 to the end of the first quarter of 1974. The value of the proxy for 
expected monetary variability at the end of the second quarter of 1974 was 
the normalized standard deviation of the monthly values of the money 
supply from March 1973 to the end of the second quarter of 1974. Thus, 
all available observations from the start of the study period were used to 
calculate values for expected monetary variability. Table 1-3 gives the 
results of regressions using the new proxies. 
The variable NC represents the normalized standard deviation of the 
U.S. money supply from March 1973 to the end of each consecutive quarter. 
The final value of NC is the actual normalized standard deviation of the 
monthly values of the U.S. money supply during the study period. Thus, 
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Table 1-3. Results when monetary variability for each quarter is proxied 
by the normalized standard deviation of the money supply for 
all observations from the beginning of the study period to the 
end of each consecutive quarter 
s = 1.50 + .35m - 1.08y + .611 + .211* - 4.64NC + 2.48NC* (28) 
(1.26) (1.87) (-2.06) (.72) (.30) (-3.47) (2.24) 
D.W. = 1.49, = .942, F = 6.17, SEE = .0072 
s = .38 + .56m^ - .86y - .0051 + .541* - 4.12NC^ + 2.33NC^* (29) 
(.32) (2.36) (-1.91) (-.007) (.90) (-3.54) (2.48) 
D.W. = 1.66, = .948, F = 1.86, SEE = .0064 
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the quarterly estimates of monetary variability converge to the actual 
variability of the money supply during the study period. 
The results indicate that these monetary variability proxies are 
important determinants of the exchange rate. As suggested by the Lapan 
and Enders model, an increase in U.S. monetary variability will cause an 
appreciation of the exchange rate, and an increase in Canadian monetary 
variability will cause a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
The results are slightly better when the exchange rate equation is 
estimated using seasonally adjusted money supply data. The coefficients 
on the interest rate variables are not significant in either equation (28) 
or (29). The coefficient on relative money supplies is significant in 
equation (29). The coefficient on the money supply variable in equation 
(28), and the coefficient on the income variable in equation (29), are 
both significant only at the .08 significance level. The t-value of the 
coefficient on relative income in equation (28) is just below the .05 
critical value. 
Under the assumption that expectations regarding monetary variability 
at a point in time are based on actual monetary variability from the 
beginning of the relevant period to that point in time, an alternate proxy 
might be the variance of the rate of growth of the money supply during the 
relevant period. The "variance of the rate of growth" proxies were 
developed using the same starting point as above. Thus, the value of the 
proxy for expected monetary variability at the end of the first quarter of 
1974 was the variance of the monthly growth rates of the money supply from 
March 1973 to the end of the first quarter of 1974. The value of the 
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proxy at the end of the second quarter of 1974 was the variance of the 
monthly growth rates of the money supply from March 1973 to the end of the 
second quarter of 1974. All available observations from the start of the 
relevant period were used to calculate the values of expected monetary 
variability. Table 1-4 shows the estimates derived using the variance of 
the rate of growth of the money supply as an alternative proxy for 
monetary variability (assuming individuals use all available observations 
to form expectations of monetary variability). 
The variable VC represents the variance of the monthly rates of 
growth of the U.S. money supply from March 1973 to the end of each 
consecutive quarter. The final value of VC is the actual variance of the 
rate of growth of the U.S. money supply during the study period. Thus, 
the quarterly estimates of monetary variability converge to the actual 
variability of the rate of growth of the money supply during the study 
period. 
The results are not quite as good when the variance of the rate of 
growth of the money supply is used instead of the normalized standard 
deviation of the money supply. The coefficients on relative money 
supplies and relative incomes in equation (30) are both significant. 
However, none of the coefficients on the interest rate variables or 
monetary variability proxies is significant at the .05 level. 
The results were improved when equation (30) was estimated in a 
slightly different form. Equation (30') indicates that the coefficient on 
U.S. monetary variability is significant at the .06 significance level. 
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Table 1-4. Results when monetary variability for each quarter is proxied 
by the variance of the rate of growth of the money supply for 
all observations from the beginning of the study period to the 
end of each consecutive quarter 
s = 2.71 + .58m - 1.75y - .661 + .651* - 948.91VC + 110.80VC* (30) 
(1.25) (3.01) (-2.27) (-.71) (.74) (-1.86) (.62) 
D.W. = 1.58, = .848, F = 2.45, SEE = .0188 
s = 2.75 + .58m - 1.76y - .6501 - 953.94VC + 111.81VC* (30') 
(1.46) (3.43) (-2.58) (-.77) (-2.04) (.65) 
D.W. = 1.58, R2 = .848, F = 3.14, SEE = .0188 
s = -1.29 + 1.06mA - .72y - 1.881 + 1.301* - 3407.1270^ 
(-.66) (3.62) (-1.27) (-2.74) (1.73) (-.64) 
+ 403.52VCA* (31) 
(1.52) 
D.W. = 1.57, R^ = .901, F = .38, SEE = .0122 
s = -1.77 + 1.18mA - .69y - 1.791 + 1.111* - 443.87DvA (31') 
(-1.01) (6.70) (-1.24) (-2.74) (1.69) (-1.77) 
D.W. = 1.67, R^ = .900, F = .58, SEE = .0124 
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The coefficients on relative money supplies and the U.S. interest 
rate in equation (31) are statistically significant. None of the coeffi­
cients on the other variables is significant at the .05 level. An 
estimated value of -1.88 for the U.S. interest rate variable implies an 
interest rate elasticity of .15. 
A A* 
An F-test of the hypothesis that VC = VC was conducted for equa­
tion (31). The resulting F-statistic of .52 indicates that the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the .05 significance level. When equation (31') was 
estimated with DV^ = VC^ - VC^ , the estimated coefficient on the DV^ term 
was found to be significant at the .10 level. 
Results for the Third Class of Proxies 
The third alternative assumption made regarding the formation of 
expectations of monetary variability is that individuals know what the 
money supply process is (but not what its variance is). Expectations of 
monetary variability will be based on the variance of the forecast errors 
that arise from the use of the true model of the money supply process. 
The first step in developing the new proxy for expected monetary 
variability is to determine what the actual money supply process was 
during the study period. The method used to identify the money supply 
process was a Box-Jenkins (4) time series analysis of the U.S. and 
Canadian money supplies using seasonally adjusted monthly data for the 
period January 1973 to December 1979. 
Second differences of the original money supply values for both 
series were taken to achieve stationarity. Autocorrelation functions and 
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partial autocorrelation functions were then estimated for both samples. 
An examination of the correlograms and partial correlograms indicated that 
the U.S. series was generated by a first-order moving-average process, and 
that the Canadian series was generated by a second-order autoregressive 
process. When the processes were estimated, the following least squares 
estimates were obtained: 
z - z = e - .99594 e , (32) 
(20.68)  
Q = 20.91 (23 degrees of freedom). 
z* = -.53493 z* , - .43737 z* + e*, (33) 
' (-5.26) (-4.28) " 
Q = 19.78 (22 degrees of freedom). 
where z = M - 2M + M , and "Q" is the chi-square statistic. The 
t t t-1 t-2 
terms in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The U.S. money supply working series was centered about its sample 
mean before being estimated (z = .0268293). Later, when forecasts were 
made, the sample mean of the working series was added back in. 
The reported chi-square statistics are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the residuals for each model are white noise. In fact, the 
hypothesis of random residuals cannot be rejected even at the .50 signifi­
cance level. 
Once again, March 1973 was assumed to represent the beginning of the 
relevant period for study. Starting at that point, the models were used 
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to make one-month-ahead forecasts of the money supply. The values of the 
proxies for expected monetary variability were determined for each quarter 
by taking the standard deviation of the values of all the monthly forecast 
errors to the end of the quarter. This methodology is based on the strong 
assumption that at the beginning of the relevant period all individuals 
knew the true model of the money supply process. An alternate assumption 
might be that individuals developed a progressively better idea of what 
the money supply process was as more information became available during 
the study period. The second assumption was not explored in this study. 
When the standard deviation of the monthly forecast errors was used 
as a proxy for monetary variability, the following results were derived: 
A A A* 
s => -.15 + .71m - .75y - 1.831 + 1.551* - .17SR + .32SR , (34) 
(-.08) (2.17) (-1.46) (-2.93) (2.26) (-2.18) (1.08) 
D.W. = 1.43, = .913, F = 1.07, SEE = .0108. 
The variable SR^ represents the standard deviation of the monthly forecast 
errors generated by using equation (32) to predict monthly levels of the 
U.S. money supply. The value of the proxy at the end of any quarter is 
the standard deviation of the monthly forecast errors from the beginning 
of the study period to the end of that quarter. The final value of SR is 
the standard deviation of all of the monthly forecast errors during the 
study period. Thus, the quarterly estimates of monetary variability 
converge to the actual (conditional) variability of the U.S. money supply 
during the study period. 
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The results again support the Lapan and Enders version of the mone­
tary approach. The coefficient on the proxy for U.S. monetary variability 
is negative and significant at the .05 level. The coefficient on relative 
money supplies and the coefficients on the interest rate variables are 
also statistically significant at the .05 level. The coefficients on the 
interest rate variables both imply interest elasticities of .15 (when the 
coefficient on the Canadian interest rate variable is multiplied by its 
mean value of .0969 and when the coefficient on the U.S. interest rate 
variable is multiplied by its mean value of .08). 
If individuals are assumed to understand the process that generates 
the money supply (but not the variance of the process), then an alterna­
tive proxy for expected monetary variability might be the variance of the 
forecast errors generated by using a true model of the rate of growth of 
the money supply. A time series analysis was conducted to determine the 
process that generates the rate of growth of each money supply. Then, a 
series of values for each new proxy was developed. 
The time series analysis made use of seasonally adjusted monthly 
values of the U.S. and Canadian money supplies for the period January 1973 
to December 1979. Before beginning the analysis, the monthly data was 
converted to monthly rates of growth. After converting to rates of 
growth, the Canadian series was stationary. However, first differences of 
the U.S. growth rate series were needed to achieve stationarity. 
Sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions were 
estimated for both working series. An examination of the correlograms and 
partial correlograms indicated that the U.S. series was generated by a 
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first-order moving-average process, and that the Canadian series was 
generated by a second-order moving-average process. When the processes 
were estimated, the following least squares estimates were derived: 
g» - g» = .00003 + G - .9916 e , (35) 
t t-1 (2.92) (20.96) 
Q = 22.24 (22 degrees of freedom), 
g = .00744 + .16278 e* - .20839 
t (6.78) (-1.46) (1.85) 
Q = 18.60 (21 degrees of freedom). 
t^-2' 
where g = (M - M )/M . 
t t-1 t-1 
The chi-square statistics are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
residuals for each model are white noise. The hypothesis of random 
residuals cannot be rejected for the U.S. model even at the .40 level, and 
the null hypothesis of random residuals cannot be rejected for the 
Canadian model even at the .60 level. 
March 1973 was assumed to be the beginning of the relevant period for 
study. Starting at that point, the models were used to make one-month-
ahead forecasts of the rate of growth of the money supplies. The values 
of the proxies for expected monetary variability were determined for each 
quarter by taking the variance of the forecast errors of the rate of 
growth of the money supplies from the beginning of the study period to the 
end of each consecutive quarter. When the variance of the forecast 
43 
errors in the growth rates was used as a proxy for monetary variability, 
the following results were obtained: 
s = -1.65 + l.lSm^ - .67y - 1.811 + 1.161* - 2995.48VR^ 
(-.83) (3.87) (-1.16) (-2.58) (1.48) (-.56) 
+ 549.66VR^*, (37) 
( 1 . 6 6 )  
D.W. = 1.58, = .903, F = .43, SEE = .0120. 
A 
The variable VR represents the variance of the monthly forecast 
errors generated by using equation (35) to predict monthly monetary growth 
rates for the United States. The value of the proxy at the end of any 
quarter is the variance of the monthly forecast errors from the beginning 
of the study period to the end of that quarter. The final value of VR^ is 
the variance of all of the monthly forecast errors during the study 
period. Thus, the quarterly estimates of monetary growth variability 
converge to the actual (conditional) variability of the rate of growth of 
the U.S. money supply during the study period. 
The results are not as strong when the variance of the "rate of 
growth" forecast errors is used. Equation (37) indicates that the 
exchange rate depends only on relative money supplies and U.S. interest 
rates. None of the coefficients on the other variables is significant at 
the .05 level. 
An F-test of the hypothesis that VR^ = VR^ was conducted for 
equation (37). The resulting F-statistic of .45 Indicated that the 
hypothesis could not be rejected at the .05 significance level. When 
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equation (37) was estimated with DVR^ = VR^ - VR^ , the following results 
were derived: 
s = -2.03 + 1.23m^ - .64y - 1.721 + .991* - 589.32DVR*, (37') 
(-1.15) (6.66) (-1.14) (-2.62) (1.47) (-1.89) 
D.W. = 1.67, R^ = .902, F = .79, SEE = .0122. 
The coefficient on DVR^ in equation (37') is significant at the .08 
significance level. The other results are very similar to those obtained 
in equation (37). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical findings of this study are broadly supportive of the 
Lapan and Enders version of the monetary approach. In particular, the 
results indicate that an increase in U.S. monetary variability will cause 
an appreciation of the U.S. dollar/Canadian dollar exchange rate. This 
result is consistent for a number of specifications of expected monetary 
variability. The results are generally better when monetary variability 
proxies are based on money supply levels rather than rates of growth. 
The findings were not as strong for Canadian monetary variability as 
they were for U.S. monetary variability. The coefficient on the proxies 
for expected Canadian monetary variability was statistically significant 
at the .05 level in only a few equations. The coefficient on the proxies 
for Canadian monetary variability did carry a positive sign in all of the 
regressions. 
No support can be drawn from this study for the King, Putnam, and 
Wilford hypothesis about the effect of monetary variability on the 
exchange rate. On the basis of these results the King, Putnam, and 
Wilford hypothesis, as it applies to the U.S./Canadian exchange rate, must 
be rejected. 
The results are supportive of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination. Various estimates of the U.S./Canada exchange rate 
equation indicate that relative money supplies and U.S. nominal Interest 
rates are Important determinants of the exchange rate. The estimated 
coefficient on the U.S. interest rate variable did carry a negative sign. 
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probably due to the similarity of inflationary expectations in both 
countries. 
In general, the results of this study suggest that exchange rate 
predictions made from monetary models will be improved by taking account 
of monetary variability. The results also support the belief that 
monetary variability has Important economic effects. To avoid unintended 
consequences of policy, decisionmakers must consider the degree of 
monetary variability attendant with a particular monetary policy. 
2 
The R 's for most of the estimated equations are comparable to ones 
derived by Humphrey and Lawler (13) and Frenkel (9) in estimates of 
exchange rate determination equations for other exchange rates. Humphrey 
2 
and Lawler believe that these types of models would yield even higher R 's 
if exchange rates were completely flexible. Periodic government interven­
tion in foreign exchange markets may reverse the direction of causality 
between money supplies and exchange rates, leading to a violation of the 
assumption of money supply exogeneity. The results of these types of 
studies may also suffer to the extent that short-run data Is being used to 
test a long-run equilibrium model. Finally, it is possible that some 
other aggregate exists which would serve as a better proxy for expected 
monetary variability than the ones employed in this study. 
This study focused on one pair of countries in order to conduct a 
comprehensive test of alternative proxies for expected monetary 
variability. The next step is to apply the methodology developed here to 
the analysis of other exchange rates. 
1 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
47 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akhtar, M. A. "Some common misconceptions about the monetary 
approach to international adjustment." In The Monetary Approach to 
International Adjustment. Edited by Bluford H. Putnam and D. Sykes 
Wilford. New York: Praeger, 1978. 
Bilson, John F. 0. "The current experience with floating exchange 
rates: an appraisal of the monetary approach." American Economic 
Review 68 (May 1978): 392-397. 
Bilson, John F. 0. "The monetary approach to the exchange rate: 
some empirical evidence." IMF Staff Papers 25 (March 1978): 48-75. 
Box, G. E. P. and G. M. Jenkins. Time Series Analysis, Forecasting 
and Control. San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc., 1970. 
Clements, Kenneth W. and Jacob A, Frenkel. "Exchange rates, money, 
and relative prices: the dollar-pound in the 1920s." Journal of 
International Economics 10 (May 1980): 249-262. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger. "Exchange rate economics: where do we stand?" 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1980. 
Fair, Ray C. "The estimation of simultaneous equation models with 
lagged endogenous variables and first order serially correlated 
errors." Econometrica 38 (May 1970): 507-516. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. "On the mark: a theory of floating exchange 
rates based on real interest differentials." American Economic 
Review 69 (September 1979): 610-622. 
Frenkel, Jacob A, "Exchange rates, prices, and money: lessons from 
the 1920's." American Economic Review 70 (May 1980): 235-242. 
Frenkel, Jacob A. and Harry G. Johnson, eds. The Monetary Approach 
to the Balance of Payments. Toronto and Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press, 1976. 
Historical Statistics 1960-1979. Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, June 1980. 
Hodrick, Robert J. "An empirical analysis of the monetary approach 
to the determination of the exchange rate." In The Economics of 
Exchange Rates; Selected Studies. Edited by Jacob A. Frenkel and 
Harry G. Johnson. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 
1978. 
48 
13. Humphrey, Thomas M. and Thomas A. Lawler. "Factors determining 
exchange rates: a simple model and empirical tests." In The 
Monetary Approach to International Adjustment. Edited by Bluford H. 
Putnam and D. Sykes Wllford. New York: Praeger, 1978. 
14. King, David. T., Bluford H. Putnam, and D. Sykes Wllford. "A 
currency portfolio approach to exchange rate determination: exchange 
rate stability and the independence of monetary policy." In The 
Monetary Approach to International Adjustment. Edited by Bluford H. 
Putnam and D. Sykes Wllford. New York: Praeger, 1978. 
15. Lapan, Harvey E. and Walter Enders. "Rational expectations, 
uncertainty and exchange rate determination." Iowa State University 
Staff Papers Series No. 107. 
16. Maddala, G. S. Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1977. 
17. Main Economic Indicators. Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, June 1980-August 1982. 
18. Rao, Potluri and Zvi Griliches. "Small-sample properties of several 
two-stage regression methods in the context of auto-correlated 
errors." Journal of the American Statistical Association 64 (March 
1969): 253-272. 
19. Theil, Henri. Principles of Econometrics. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1971. 
20. World Financial Markets. New York: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., March 
1978-March 1980. 
49 
SECTION II. THE EURODOLLAR MARKET: 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
The Eurodollar market is a global market for the trading of dollar-
denominated deposits that are booked with banks located outside of the 
United States, including foreign branches of U.S. banks. The market has 
grown very rapidly since its inception in the late 1950s, and it is now 
the primary avenue for international short-term capital movements (12). 
Its rapid growth has been the source of much controversy within the 
economics profession. Writers such as Friedman (6) and Bell (2) have 
proposed that the large expansion of Eurodollar deposits is the result of 
a multiple deposit expansion process similar to that which occurs in a 
domestic banking system. Other economists view Eurodollar bankers more as 
auctioneers of short-term capital than as analogues of government-regu­
lated domestic bankers. Freedman (5) and Hewson and Sakakibara (8, 9) 
believe that the highly competitive and virtually unregulated Eurodollar 
market more closely resembles a perfectly competitive financial market 
than a domestic credit market. 
Empirical tests of the two opposing viewpoints were conducted for the 
Eurodollar market during the period when the major industrial countries 
maintained fixed exchange rates, Makin's (18) test of the fractional 
reserve banking model and Hewson's and Sakakibara's (8) test of the 
perfectly competitive banking model reached differing conclusions about 
the Eurodollar market. 
The purpose of this study is to develop a model of the Eurodollar 
market that corresponds more closely to the current international finance 
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structure than the previous paradigms. The model is then tested for the 
period of flexible exchange rates that followed the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
A Eurodollar is a dollar-denominated deposit liability of a commer­
cial bank located outside of the United States, including foreign branches 
of U.S. banks. Eurodollars are created when an economic entity removes 
funds from an account with a U.S. bank and deposits them in a "dollar" 
account of a foreign bank, or when the economic entity trades foreign 
currency for dollars in the foreign exchange market and then deposits the 
dollars with a foreign bank. Dollar banking activity outside of the U.S. 
is concentrated in Western Europe, primarily the London money market. 
However, major dollar markets are also located in Canada, Singapore, 
Japan, Bahrain, and the Bahamas (31). 
Eurodollar deposits consist mainly of short-term time deposits. As 
of November 1979 about 23 percent of all Eurocurrency deposits in United 
Kingdom-based Eurodollar banks were in the less than eight-day maturity 
range, 47 percent were in the eight-day to three-month range, and 26 
percent were in the three-month to one-year range (26). 
The primary sources of dollar balances that go into the Eurodollar 
market are large corporations, foreign commercial banks, central banks, 
and international organizations such as the Bank for International Settle­
ments (13). Originally central banks were the most important source of 
funds to the Eurodollar market, holding in 1962 about two-thirds of all 
Eurodollar deposits (15). Since then, corporations have become the 
predominate sources of funds (13), although central bank holdings of Euro­
dollars are still substantial (31). 
Borrowers of the dollar claims deposited with Eurodollar banks are 
primarily other Eurodollar banks and corporations. Some Eurodollar banks 
act only as intermediaries between Eurodollar banks (15). 
The emergence of the Eurodollar market in the late 1950s can be 
traced to three events. The first was an attempt by the Soviet Union and 
other Eastern European countries to protect their dollar assets in the 
event of heightened tensions with the United States. To guard against a 
possible freeze or confiscation of their dollar accounts, these countries 
transferred their dollar balances from U.S. commercial banks to banks in 
London and Paris (13). 
The second event which helped to create the Eurodollar market was the 
sterling crisis of 1957 which prompted the British authorities to prohibit 
the use of sterling in financing nonsterling trade. British bankers 
responded to the ban by offering dollar loans in place of sterling loans, 
and since London was one of the major financial centers for international 
trade, this created a considerable demand for dollar deposits. The final 
event which enabled the Eurodollar market to develop occurred in 1958 when 
the major European countries made their currencies freely convertible into 
the dollar (15). 
The development of the Eurodollar market was enhanced in the 1960s by 
U.S. government policies aimed at correcting U.S. balance of payments 
deficits. Concern with capital account deficits prompted U.S. authorities 
to enact a number of restrictions on U.S. foreign investment. The 1963 
Interest Equalization Tax restricted the access of borrowers in overseas 
industrialized countries to the U.S. capital market by placing a levy on 
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the sale of foreign bonds and equities in the U.S. Tlie 1965 "voluntary" 
credit restraint program asked banks and nonbanks to limit their overseas 
lending, and the 1968 mandatory program forced multinational corporations 
to look for dollar financing outside of the U.S. All of these programs 
forced European corporations and U.S. subsidiaries to turn to the Euro­
dollar market for dollar financing of investment (22). 
Federal Reserve credit tightening and time deposit interest rate 
ceilings also spurred the growth of the Eurodollar market in the late 
1960s. In 1966, and again in 1969, Federal Reserve credit restriction 
caused interest rates to rise sharply. As nominal rates rose above 
Regulation Q ceilings, banks could not compete for funds and the large New 
York banks experienced a runoff of certificates of deposit as multi­
national corporations switched their deposits to the Eurodollar market. 
The large New York banks then borrowed back these funds from the Euro­
dollar market, usually operating through their foreign branch offices. At 
that time, the Eurodollar market was a very attractive source of funds for 
U.S. banks since there was no reserve requirement on Eurodollar 
borrowings and because the Eurodollar market offered funds with maturities 
similar to the CDs they replaced (13). 
On a more theoretical level, Swoboda (27) attributed the early growth 
of the Eurodollar market to a more or less conscious effort by European 
banks to bid away some of the denomination rents that accrued to the U.S. 
banking system under the fixed exchange rate system because of the ability 
of U.S. banks to offer liabilities that were accepted as the key inter­
national currency. The Eurodollar market in this analysis would be seen 
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by Eurodollar banks as a means of breaking the monopoly of American banks 
on dollar financial transactions. 
The Eurodollar market has been able to compete with the U.S. banking 
system for dollar-denominated financial assets and liabilities by offering 
potential investors rates of return on Eurodollar investments that are 
higher than those on other comparable investments, and by offering 
borrowers credit on more favorable terms than could be arranged elsewhere 
(13). In order to offer investors higher rates of return and borrowers 
lower loan rates, Eurodollar banks must operate on much narrower margins 
than other commercial banks. For Eurodollar transactions between prime 
Eurodollar banks, the margin is usually between 1/4 and 1/32 percent. 
Eurodollar banks are able to operate on such narrow margins because trans­
actions are large-scale and borrowers are large, widely-recognized 
economic entities (hence affording low default risk), and because there 
are typically no (or very low) reserve requirements on Eurodollar deposits 
(15). 
The self-imposed reserve ratio for Eurodollar deposits may be as low 
as one or two percent (24). There are four basic reasons why such small 
reserves are held against Eurodollar deposits. First, banks that offer 
Eurodollar accounts are large banks with considerable domestic assets. 
Second, Eurodollar banks all have lines of credit established with corre­
spondent banks in the U.S. Third, the extensive Eurodollar market is 
itself a ready source of funds. Finally, there is a high degree of 
matching of Eurodollar assets and liabilities in terms of maturity and 
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since the bulk of deposits are time deposits Eurodollar banks do not face 
significant stochastic reserve losses (13). 
It seems likely that the major role played by the U.S. balance of 
payments deficits in the development of the Eurodollar market was the 
provision of enough international liquidity so that the post-war exchange 
controls could be removed. There is little empirical relation between the 
rate of growth of the Eurodollar market and the U.S. balance of payments 
deficits. One can point to the rapid growth of the Eurodeutsche mark 
market during a time in which the West German balance of payments was in a 
strong surplus position to illustrate the fact that a balance of payments 
deficit is not necessary for the development of any particular Euro­
currency market (4). 
Mayer (21) believes that the U.S. balance of payments deficits 
actually slowed the growth of the Eurodollar market since they reduced 
confidence in the dollar. If the U.S. balance had been in surplus, then 
credit would have been tighter in foreign countries, leading to a dollar 
flow from the U.S. through the Eurodollar market to other countries. 
The effective exercise of oil cartel power in 1974 and the concomi­
tant oil price increases also enhanced the growth of the Eurodollar market 
since a large volume of dollars accrued to OPEC members who had a strong 
preference for short-term investments. The Eurodollar market with its 
high deposit rates and freedom from regulations became a key recipient of 
OPEC funds (22). 
Even though the development of the Eurodollar market was clearly 
enhanced by inadvertent U.S. government policies and by the ability of 
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Eurodollar banks to attract funds by operating on narrow margins, Euro­
dollar deposits grew so rapidly that it led economists to question whether 
the growth of the Eurodollar market could be attributed in part to 
multiple credit expansion within the Eurodollar banking system. In 1960, 
total Eurodollar deposit liabilities measured one billion dollars. During 
the next ten years. Eurodollar deposits grew at a rate of approximately 50 
percent per annum (15), and during the 1970s at an average annual growth 
rate of about 30 percent. By the fourth quarter of 1981, gross Eurodollar 
deposits totaled approximately 1,350 billion dollars (31). 
Two of the earliest writers to use the multiple credit expansion 
model were Bell (2) and Friedman (6). Both writers believed that the 
Eurodollar market could create credit by a process directly analogous to 
credit creation in the U.S. banking system, implying that the rapid growth 
of the Eurodollar market was the result of multiple deposit expansion in a 
fractional reserve banking system. 
As Friedman explained it. Eurodollar deposit creation began when an 
economic entity, say a corporation, transferred funds from an account with 
a U.S. bank to a dollar account with a foreign bank. If the amount of the 
transfer was $1 million, then that amount would be credited to the 
corporation's account with the foreign bank, and the foreign bank would 
hold a $1 million claim in the form of a deposit liability of a U.S. bank. 
Since the foreign bank needed to hold only a fraction of the deposit as 
reserves the bank had excess dollars to loan out. If the foreign bank 
held reserves that amounted to ten percent of Eurodollar deposits then it 
would be able to make $900,000 worth of loans. 
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Now assume that the foreign bank loaned out the $900,000 to a second 
corporation. This it would do by transferring ownership of $900,000 of 
the deposit liability of the U.S. bank to the second corporation. Assume 
further that the corporation used the claim to purchase $900,000 worth of 
goods from a third corporation, and that the third corporation deposited 
the claim on the U.S. bank with a second Eurodollar bank. 
At this stage in the credit creation process $1,900,000 worth of 
Eurodollar deposit liabilities have been created—$1,000,000 held by the 
first corporation and $900,000 held by the third corporation. Notice also 
that if all participants in the chain of transactions have accounts at the 
same U.S. bank, then the U.S. bank's overall balance sheet has not been 
affected. Instead of $1,000,000 of demand deposit liabilities owed to the 
first corporation, it has $100,000 of deposit liabilities owed to the 
first Eurodollar bank and $900,000 of deposit liabilities owed to the 
second Eurodollar bank. Unless the legal reserves that the U.S. bank must 
hold against demand deposits are affectd by who owns the deposits, then 
the U.S. money supply will not be affected. However, the world supply of 
dollars net of interbank deposits has increased by $900,000 and the second 
Eurodollar bank has excess dollar reserves with which it can extend more 
dollar-denominated loans. 
In this simple example, the Eurodollar-creation process will continue 
until someone who receives a Eurodollar loan deposits the dollars with a 
U.S. bank, or transfers the dollars to someone else who deposits them with 
a U.S. bank. The Eurodollar deposit creation process as described by 
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Friedman is, thus, directly analogous to the textbook illustration of the 
working of a two-stage banking system. 
Following Niehans and Hewson (24), it is possible to express the 
Friedman Eurodollar-creation model in an algebraic form that relates the 
stock of Eurodollar deposits to a base. Let E represent Eurodollar 
deposits held by the nonbank public, let R represent demand deposits at 
U.S. banks that are held by Eurodollar banks as reserves, and let r be the 
reserve ratio. Now make the simplifying assumption that the amount of 
Eurodollar deposits that the nonbank public desires to hold is a linear 
function of their total liquid dollar assets (A), where A is defined to be 
the U.S. money supply (M) plus Eurodollar deposits (E) minus U.S. bank 
deposits held by the Eurodollar banks (R). Then, a Friedman-type model of 
the Eurodollar market would consist of the following equations: 
Substituting equations (1) and (3) into equation (2) gives an expression 
for the supply of Eurodollars : 
R = rE (1) 
E = aA + b, and ( 2 )  
A = M + E - R (3) 
(4) 
where the U.S. money supply serves as the monetary base for the Eurodollar 
system. For a given U.S. money supply, the effect of a shift from U.S. 
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dollars into Eurodollars (measured by db) on the volume of Eurodollars is 
given as: 
dE _ 1 
db 1—a(l-r) 
where the term on the right is the Eurodollar multiplier. Since "a" 
represents the fraction of total liquid dollar assets that the nonbank 
public wishes to hold in the form of Eurodollar deposits, it is the 
redeposit ratio and can be taken as a measure of "leakages" out of the 
Eurodollar system. The redeposit ratio equals (1-c) where "c" is the 
leakage ratio, so that the smaller the leakages, the larger is the value 
of "a." 
It is apparent that the Eurodollar multiplier derived above has 
exactly the same form as the simple money multiplier for a domestic 
banking system. Just as the size of the domestic money multiplier is 
determined by the reserve ratio and leakages from demand deposits into 
currency, so too is the size of the Eurodollar multiplier limited by the 
values of the Eurodollar reserve ratio and the leakages from Eurodollars 
into U.S. domestic dollar accounts. 
The degree to which Eurodollars are actually created through multiple 
deposit expansion depends on the values of "a" and "r." Since Eurodollar 
banks hold small reserves against their dollar-denominated liabilities, 
"r" will tend to be small and the multiplier will tend to be large. This 
leads Friedman to state that Eurodollars "are mostly the product of the 
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bookkeeper's pen—that is, the result of fractional reserve banking" (6, 
p. 10), even though he admits that leakages could be large. One of the 
implications of the Friedman model is that the Eurodollar market is a 
source of world inflation because of its ability to increase the world 
supply of dollars through multiple deposit expansion. If the Eurodollar 
market is capable of multiple credit expansion, then it is also capable of 
multiple credit contraction and must be a potential source of monetary 
instability. 
It is possible to get a general idea of the size of multiplier 
implied in the Friedman model by assigning values to the multiplier 
coefficients. If a relatively high value of "a" is assigned (say .25), 
and a low value of "r" is assigned (say .01), then the simple Eurodollar 
multiplier equals 1.33. 
Bell (2) increases the possibility that the Eurodollar multiplier 
will be large by introducing central banks into the model. According to 
his analysis, if Eurodollar borrowers convert their loans into local 
currency, and if the central banks place the dollars they acquire in 
accounts at Eurodollar banks, then the Eurodollar system can extend more 
credit than suggested by the simple multiplier. Even allowing for central 
bank redepositing of Eurodollar loan proceeds that go into the foreign 
exchange market. Bell admits that leakages are probably larger in the 
Eurodollar market than in a domestic banking system. 
A number of writers have criticized Friedman for confusing financial 
institutions that maintain fractional reserves with financial institutions 
that engage in multiple credit expansion. Klopstock (11, 12), and more 
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recently Willms (30), maintain that credit expansion in the Eurodollar 
market much more closely resembles that which occurs in a three-stage 
banking system than in a two-stage banking system. In particular, only a 
small proportion of Eurodollar deposits serve as a medium of exchange; 
most call and overnight deposits are held by other Eurodollar banks (12). 
Also, the reserves of Eurodollar banks are held as deposits with U.S. 
commercial banks rather than with central banks. Eurodollar banks are 
viewed as financial intermediaries in an international money market that 
attract funds from surplus areas and disburse them to deficit areas. The 
correct domestic analogue, then, is the saving and loan association rather 
than the commercial bank. 
The main difference between U.S. commercial banks and Eurodollar 
banks, according to Klopstock (12), is that, as a group, the Eurodollar 
banks can count on recapturing as deposits only a small fraction of their 
loans. Two major characteristics of the Eurodollar system for which there 
is no clear analogy in the U.S. banking system account for large deposit 
leakages. The first characteristic is that a large proportion of the 
dollar deposits coming into the foreign branches of U.S. banks are 
funneled back to their home offices. Most of these funds are, in turn, 
employed in the U.S. The second characteristic is the tendency for a 
large amount of the balances placed in the Eurodollar market to go into 
the foreign exchange market. In Klopstock's view, any redepositing of 
Eurodollar loan proceeds acquired by central banks in the foreign exchange 
market is the exception to the general rule that when Eurodollars are 
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loaned out, only a small part of the loan proceeds ever show up as 
deposits in other Eurodollar banks. 
Since leakages are larger for a three-stage banking system than for a 
two-stage system, the multiplier for a "Klopstock" Eurodollar market is 
smaller than the multiplier for a "Friedman" Eurodollar market. In fact, 
Klopstock believes that leakages are so large that the Eurodollar credit 
multiplier lies between 0.5 and 0.9 (11). Given the low value of the 
mulitplier, one need not be very concerned with the inflationary conse­
quences of the Eurodollar market. Instead of the bookkeeper's pen, 
Klopstock believes that the rapid growth of Eurodollar deposits must be 
accounted for by the "breadth, convenience, safety, low costs of doing 
business, and relatively high interest rates" (11, p. 19) provided by the 
Eurodollar market. 
Empirical studies have not helped to resolve the differences between 
the Friedman and Klopstock schools of thought since attempts to estimate 
the Eurodollar multiplier have yielded widely different results. Lee (13) 
calculated a Eurodollar multiplier that averaged about 1.5 from the first 
quarter of 1963 to the fourth quarter of 1969, and Makin (18) estimated a 
long-run deposit multiplier of 18.45 for a time period almost identical to 
that considered by Lee. 
Lee derived a simple form for a Eurodollar multiplier by working from 
a money supply identity and a Eurodollar "base" identity and then 
replacing the components of the mulitplier with their actual values. The 
money supply equation Lee used was directly analogous to a domestic money 
supply equation, having the form: 
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, «./=. + " c ' h  
V \  + 
+ + 
nr/f 
1 
+ R/E -) B. 
( 6 )  
n 
The term In parentheses is the Eurodollar multiplier with E^ representing 
Eurodollars net of interbank deposits, with R representing Eurodollar 
banks' reserves held with New York banks, and with , and repre­
senting short-term dollar holdings in the U.S. of foreign official insti­
tutions, foreign private nonbanks, and international organizations. 
represents the dollar holdings in the U.S. of foreign commercial banks 
other than those holdings used as reserves by Eurodollar banks. In Lee's 
framework, the sum represents an aggregate that performs 
a function in the Eurodollar market that is analogous to currency in a 
domestic banking system. In Lee's model, is identically equal to 
+ Dp + + E^ and the equation is analogous to a domestic money 
supply identity. B is equal to + R and is the Euro­
dollar market's counterpart to a domestic monetary base. 
Foreign holders of dollars in the above model indirectly affect the 
volume of Eurodollar deposits through their determination of the ratio of 
dollars held in the U.S. to dollars held in the Eurodollar market. The 
ratio of Eurodollar reserves held with New York banks to net Eurodollar 
deposits also affects the overall level of Eurodollar deposits. 
Lee used actual quarterly observations of D /E , D /E , D /E , D./E , 
on cn p n in 
and R/E^ to calculate twenty-eight quarterly values for the multiplier. 
He found that the multiplier grew steadily from a value of 1.2663 for 
the first quarter of 1963 to 1.9213 by the fourth quarter of 1969. The 
values of the multiplier were consistent with the view that leakages 
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from the Eurodollar system are large. Lee also calculated that central 
banks may be responsible for as much as 67.9 percent of the return flow of 
funds into the Eurodollar market (lending support to Bell's contention 
that central bank redepositing may be an important source of funds to the 
Eurodollar market). Foreign private nonbanks ranked second in importance 
by contributing 18 percent of the return flow. 
Makin (18) derives a Eurodollar reserve multiplier using empirical 
estimates of stock supply and demand functions for Eurodollars. Makin's 
model of the Eurodollar market consists of equations for the stock demand 
for Eurodollars, the stock supply of Eurodollars, the ratio of 
precautionary reserves to Eurodollars supplied, and a market-clearing 
equation. Formally: 
EDD = f(I, r , r ,, g, DM), (7) 
e cd 
EDS = h(EBR), (8) 
EBR/EDS = j(r^, r^^, S^, EDS), and (9) 
EDD = EDS (10) 
where EDD and EDS represent the real stock of Eurodollars demanded and 
supplied, and where EBR represents the real stock of Eurodollar banks' 
precautionary reserves (measured by demand deposits of foreign commercial 
banks held at U.S. banks, exclusive of claims on head offices by foreign 
branches). The scale variable in the demand equation is real imports of 
industrial countries; and the substitution variables, r^, r^^, g, and DM, 
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are, respectively, the rate of return on 90-day Eurodollar time deposits, 
the rate of return on 90-day negotiable certificates of deposit, the 
expected return on gold, and the forward premium of dollars against 
deutsche marks in annual percentage terms. The EDS term in the reserve 
ratio equation represents the effects of economies of scale in reserve 
management, the r^^ term is a proxy for the cost of running out of 
2 
reserves, and the is a proxy for the variance of net receipts and 
disbursements. The endogenous variables in Makin's system are the level 
of precautionary reserves, the rate of return on Eurodollar deposits, and 
the stock supply of Eurodollars. 
The model was fitted for 26 quarterly observations from the third 
quarter of 1964 through the fourth quarter of 1970. Assuming that the 
adjustment of the supply of Eurodollars to changes in Eurodollar bank 
reserves takes place over time, the stock supply equation was estimated as 
a distributed lag of the Koyck type. The formulation employed was; 
(11) 
where the desired stock of Eurodollars supplied was: 
EDsf = a + a,EBR + e_ 
t o 1 t t (12) 
and the rate of adjustment of supply to desired supply is "X" as given 
by; 
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AEDS^ = A(EDsJ - EDS^_^). (13) 
The estimated values of the equation were; 
EDS = -193.2 + 16.36EBR + .733EDS^ , (14) 
t t t-1 
2 
with all coefficients significant and R = .989. 
The coefficient on the EDS^ ^ term implies that X = .267, or that 
about one-fourth of the adjustment of supply to changes in reserves is 
completed in one quarter. With X = .267 it is apparent that a^ = 61.25. 
If "f" represents the feedback ratio of funds reentering the Euro­
dollar system, then the Eurodollar multiplier is l/(l-f). To calculate 
this multiplier, it is necessary to take account of the fact that between 
1964 and 1970 the level of reserves held against Eurodollar deposits 
declined at a rate of about 3.45 percent per quarter. This means that: 
AEDSJ. ^ AEBR^ 
AEBR " 1-Kf ^ " AEBR ' 
t t—1 
Since K is approximately equal to 1.04, it follows from equation (14) that 
in the short run (one quarter): 
AEDS^ ^ 
ÂËBR^ " " l-1.04fgj^* (16)  
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If the short-run multiplier is l/(l-fg^), then solving equation (16) gives 
f = .903 and the short-run Eurodollar multiplier is about 10.31. 
In the long run, the actual stock supply of Eurodollars will equal 
the desired supply. It follows, then, from equation (12) that in the long 
run: 
AEDS 
= 61.25 = (17) 
AEBR^ 1-1.04f^^ 
which indicates that f = .9458 and that the long-run Eurodollar multi­
plier equals 18.45. 
To get an idea of the proportion of Eurodollar deposit growth that 
was attributable to the multiple deposit expansion process, Makin multi­
plied the long-run Eurodollar multiplier of 18.45 by the change in 
reserves of Eurodollar banks that occurred during the study period, and 
compared that figure with the total change in Eurodollar deposits that 
occurred during the same time. That comparison led Makin to believe that 
40 percent of the growth of Eurodollar deposits during the study period 
was due to multiple deposit expansion, with 60 percent of the growth due 
to new deposits. The conclusion that emerges from Makin's study is that 
Friedman-type multiple deposit expansion has accounted for a large portion 
of the growth of the Eurodollar market. 
Until the early 1970s, most of the theoretical discussions of the 
Eurodollar market focused on whether the two-stage or three-stage banking 
model was the appropriate one for analyzing Eurodollar credit creation. 
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Despite differences of opinion as to the size of the Eurodollar multi­
plier, adherents of both schools of thought were in agreement that the 
general Eurodollar deposit creation process could be expressed as: 
D = mR (18) 
where D represents the stock of Eurodollar deposits and R represents the 
stock of precautionary reserves held in the U.S. banking system (3, 30). 
The value of the mulitplier (m) is, of course, determined by the value of 
the "leakage" coefficients—the proportion of liquid dollar assets that 
are held in the Eurodollar system and the proportion of Eurodollar 
deposits held as reserves with U.S. commercial banks. For D = mR to be a 
meaningful expression, the coefficients must be "fixed" in the sense that 
new dollar inflows from the U.S. do not affect interest rates on dollar or 
Eurodollar short-term assets. Otherwise, new dollar inflows would change 
interest rates and changes in interest rates would cause portfolio adjust­
ments by Eurodollar banks and by the nonbank public which would alter the 
values of the leakage coefficients. 
That this "fixed coefficient" approach should be used so widely in 
explaining the operation of the Eurodollar market is somewhat surprising. 
As early as 1963, Tobin (28) pointed out that the fixed coefficient money 
multiplier paradigm is most appropriate for credit markets in which legal 
reserve requirements are effective and in which deposit rates are rigid 
and, therefore, fail to clear the market. The 1934 Banking Act prohibi­
tion of Interest payments on demand deposits and the Regulation Q Interest 
rate ceilings on time deposits, and the cartel-like structure of banking 
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in Europe, made deposit rates in both the United States and Europe rela­
tively rigid throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s (9). Therefore, 
it is not unreasonable as a first approximation to assume that during the 
1960s and 1970s the leakages ratios in domestic banking systems in Europe 
and the United States were relatively constant. In particular, if a 
domestic banking system is prohibited from paying interest on demand 
deposits, then the ratio of currency to demand deposits that the nonbank 
public maintains should be constant in the short-run. 
The highly competitive and largely unregulated Eurodollar market more 
closely resembles a perfectly competitive financial market than a domestic 
credit market. Eurodollar interest rates are determined competitively 
each day and are sensitive to new dollar inflows. This means that the 
leakage coefficients for the Eurodollar multiplier will not be fixed and 
that the interest rates on Eurodollar deposits will play a large role in 
determining the extent to which new dollar inflows can be translated into 
additional deposits. In particular, the "interest rate leakages" in the 
Eurodollar system must be considered. 
Interest rate leakages occur because an autonomous shift of dollar 
deposits into the Eurodollar system will cause a reduction in Eurodollar 
interest rate and an induced shift of Eurodollar deposits out of the 
system. Studies by Freedman (5) and Hewson and Sakaklbara (8, 9) have 
applied Tobin-type (29) general equilibrium portfolio models to the Euro­
dollar market to examine interest rate leakages and likely values of the 
Eurodollar mulitplier. These general equilibrium Eurodollar models view 
Eurodollar banks as pure financial intermediaries that do not possess 
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independent demand and supply functions for loans and deposits. Since the 
Eurodollar market is highly competitive, it is assumed that Eurodollar 
banks earn a constant margin between Eurodollar loan and deposit rates. 
For simplicity, it is usually assumed that Eurodollar banks hold no 
reserves and that the margin between loan and deposit rates is, in fact, 
zero: the justifications being that Eurodollar banks do not face stochas­
tic reserve losses so they do not need to hold precautionary reserves, and 
that the margin is constant and very narrow. The Eurodollar market, then, 
is a perfectly competitive market in which adjustments in the Eurodollar 
interest rate occur to equate the supply of Eurodollar deposits with the 
demand for Eurodollar loans. 
Hewson and Sakakibara (8) developed a general equilibrium portfolio 
adjustment model of the Eurodollar market along the lines of the above 
assumptions, and they introduced central banks into the analysis by 
proposing that they place in the Eurodollar market a constant fraction of 
their total foreign reserve holdings. Their equilibrium equation for the 
Eurodollar market is; 
n n 
cd • FOR + Z D = Z L, (19) 
i=l i=l 
where is the demand by country i for Eurodollar deposits, is the 
demand by country i for Eurodollar loans, FOR is the total foreign 
reserves of central banks (assuming that the dollar is the only inter­
national reserve currency), and cd is the ratio of central bank foreign 
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reserves held on deposit in Eurodollar banks to total foreign reserves. 
The demand functions for deposits and loans are assumed to be functions of 
net wealth, income, and rates of return on alternative short-term assets. 
The world is assumed to be on a fixed exchange rate system. Given 
that the level of foreign reserves of the central banks equals the sura of 
their deposits with Eurodollar banks (D„„ ) plus the accumulated overall 
EC,ED 
U.S. balance of payments deficit on the official settlements account 
(Bus)» then an equation for foreign reserves can be represented as: 
"O" • °EC,ED + «OS (2°) 
or 
or 
FOR = cd • FOR + Byg (21) 
FOR = (l/(l-cd)) (Byg). (22) 
Substituting yields: 
For convenience, assume that all the scale and substitution variables 
are constant except for the rate of return on Eurodollar deposits (r) . 
Now let "s" represent an autonomous inflow of dollars. By assumption, 
this will be completely loaned out and the individuals receiving the loans 
will convert them to domestic currency. The first round impact of an 
autonomous portfolio shift is to increase B^g and by the same amount. 
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The shift parameter impacts on both terms. If "V" is the total volume of 
Eurodollar deposit liabilities, then the Eurodollar "interest rate" multi­
plier is: 
„ = (24) 
or 
cd . "us d, + ds + dr + as 
m ^^ . (25) 
as 
Simplifying yields: 
" S - "ra + ^"37  ^+ ra * IÏÏ- (2*) 
Totally differentiating equation (23) with respect to s gives: 
ds 8L 3D SB • 
(l-cd)Z^ cd 
Since 3L^/9r < 0, 8D^/9r > 0, and 3B^g/3r > 0 it is apparent that dr/ds 
< 0. Substituting into equation (26) yields: 
m = 
9EDj 
"IF 
cd 
1-cd 
3B. 
US 
3r 
1-cd 
(l-cd)E ( 
3L^ 
3r 
3D^ 
3r 
3B, 
( 2 8 )  
-) - cd US 
3r 
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An Important implication of the Hewson-Sakakibara model is that in 
the absence of central bank depositing of foreign reserves in the Euro­
dollar market (cd=0), the Eurodollar multiplier would lie between zero and 
unity. An autonomous shift of dollars from the U.S. to the Eurodollar 
market would tend to lower the Eurodollar rate relative to U.S. (and 
European) interest rates, thereby diminishing the attractiveness of Euro­
dollar deposits and causing a secondary shift out of Eurodollars. 
However, the lower rate on Eurodollar loans would increase the quantity 
demanded so the overall effect of the shift of funds into the Eurodollar 
market would be positive. With central bank participation in the Euro­
dollar market, the maximum value of the multiplier would be l/(l-cd). 
To derive a value for the Eurodollar multiplier. Hewson and 
Sakakibara arbitrarily dropped the 3Byg/3r terms and divided the world 
into two regions: the United States and Canada, and Western Europe 
(except Switzerland). They then determined the values of the partials in 
the mulitplier by simultaneously estimating loan and deposit demand 
functions for both regions using monthly data for the period 1968-72. The 
actual Eurodollar variables employed were dollar assets and liabilities of 
United Kingdom banks with respect to residents and banks of the two 
regions. Hewson and Sakakibara assumed that demand for Eurodollar 
deposits and loans was a function of wealth variables, income variables, 
Interest rate variables, and speculative variables. They also included 
dummy variables in each equation relating to controls over short-term 
capital flows that were imposed during the period and to speculative 
activity coinciding with the suspension of convertibility of official 
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dollar holdings into gold. As a proxy for cd they used the ratio of "the 
change in the sum of 'Identified official holdings of Euro-dollars' plus 
'Unidentified Euro-currencies and residual' to the change in total foreign 
reserves of all member countries of the International Monetary Fund" (8, 
p. 324). 
The value of the multiplier was found to be 1.41 when estimated 
values of the partials and the cd term were substituted into the multi­
plier equation. This was considered a maximum value since the proxy for 
cd tends to overstate its true value, and because the assumption that cd 
is fixed ignores the interest rate impacts on central bank holdings of 
Eurodollars and, thus, overstates the multiplier. Hewson and Sakakibara 
believed it realistic to assume in the context of this model that the true 
multiplier is close to unity. 
The estimated value of the multiplier was substantially lower when a 
different proxy was used for cd. When an average ratio of central banks' 
holdings of Eurodollars to total foreign reserves was used as the cd term, 
the value of the multiplier was .54. 
Although the values of the multipliers obtained by Lee (13) and 
Hewson and Sakakibara (8) are numerically similar, they are not comparable 
because they conceal sharply differing views of how the Eurodollar market 
functions. In particular, adherents of the "general equilibrium" view­
point would insist that it was meaningless for Lee to calculate a ratio of 
total Eurodollar deposits to some measure of Eurodollar reserves and 
deduce an ex post multiplier (19). 
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Makin (18) has been alternately criticized for using too narrow a 
definition of Eurodollar bank reserves (30) or too broad a definition (8). 
The main problem with Makin's study, however, lies with his attempt to 
relate a stock of Eurodollar deposits to a level of Eurodollar bank 
reserves when those reserves are actually transactions balances rather 
than precautionary reserves. 
A final school of thought to emerge from the debate concerning the 
working of the Eurodollar market contends that regardless of the size of 
the mulitplier, the Eurodollar market creates very little liquidity. 
Niehans (23) asserts that the asset transformation performed by financial 
intermediaries can increase the liquidity of the nonbank public only if 
the claims of the nonbank public against the financial intermediaries are 
in the aggregate more liquid than its debts to the financial intermedi­
aries. This implies that the impact of the Eurodollar market on world 
liquidity can be assessed by analyzing the maturity matching of Eurodollar 
assets and liabilities. One way to do this is to imagine that the 
maturity of different liabilities and assets has a liquidity "weight" that 
varies between zero and one. If cash has a liquidity weight of one and 
the least liquid asset in an economy has a zero weight, then the Euro­
dollar system creates liquidity only if the weighted sum of Eurodollar 
deposits exceeds the weighted sum of Eurodollar loans owed to Eurodollar 
banks. 
Niehans and Hewson (24) examined the maturity structure of Euro­
currency claims and liabilities for all United Kingdom-based Eurocurrency 
banks as of September 30, 1973 and found an extremely close maturity 
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matching of assets and liabilities. By dividing bank claims and liabili­
ties into seven maturity classes and arbitrarily assigning weights to each 
maturity class, they discovered that for every dollar of deposits, 
liquidity creation amounted to just 4.45 cents. When they examined the 
claims and liabilities of those Eurocurrency banks relative to nonbanks 
they found that liquidity creation amounted to 16.49 cents for every 
dollar of deposits. The low degree of maturity transformation implies 
that a large value for the Eurodollar multiplier would be meaningless 
because deposit expansion does not add liquidity to the world economy. If 
the Eurodollar system does not create liquidity then it cannot generate 
inflation. Since Eurodollar banks closely match the maturities of assets 
and liabilities, they are less subject to liquidity risk than domestic 
banks so the Eurodollar system may be more stable than domestic banking 
systems. 
The results of the study are consistent with the view that the Euro­
dollar system is a network for the efficient distribution of short-term 
funds. In particular, the Eurodollar market is an interbank market in 
which funds from ultimate lenders pass through many Eurodollar banks 
before reaching ultimate borrowers. According to Niehans and Hewson, the 
ability of the Eurodollar system to lower the cost of information to 
ultimate transactors is what accounts for the rapid growth of the Euro­
dollar market. 
A later study by Heinevetter (7) indicates that the results obtained 
by Niehans and Hewson may be dependent on the base year selected. 
Heinevetter shows that liquidity creation in the Eurodollar market has 
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increased considerably since 1973 and now may be at a level that is 
significant when compared to some domestic banking systems. 
Additionally, one must question whether the "maturity" of assets and 
liabilities is the only characteristic which is important in determining 
liquidity. For instance, the ability of the Eurodollar system to perform 
"risk transformation" on assets and liabilities may have a significant 
impact on the behavior of ultimate transactors in the market. 
Since the "fixed coefficient" approach suffers from attempting to 
describe an unregulated and highly competitive financial market with a 
model that is more appropriate to a heavy regulated domestic financial 
market it seems apparent that the "general equilibrium" approach offers 
the most satisfactory model of the Eurodollar market. This suggests that 
the proper focus of an attempt to examine the impact of new dollar inflows 
on the volume of Eurodollar deposits must be the interest rate multiplier 
rather than the reserve multiplier. 
There is one area, however, in which the general equilibrium models 
can be improved, and that is in their treatment of central banks, Hewson 
and Sakakibara (8) assume that central banks deposit a constant fraction 
of their foreign reserve holdings in the Eurodollar market. This seems to 
be an overly simplified and unnecessarily restrictive assumption. A more 
appropriate assumption might be that central banks have the same motiva­
tion as private investors in determining the combination of financial 
instruments to hold in their portfolios. Therefore, a central bank demand 
function for Eurodollar deposits should have a scale variable that relates 
to its official reserve holdings, it should have interest rate variables 
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that relate to alternative opportunities for Investment, and it should 
have speculative variables that relate to expectations about future move­
ments of exchange rates. 
While there may be some justification under a fixed exchange rate 
system for assuming, as Hewson and Sakakibara (8) did, that every Euro­
dollar loaned out finds its way through the foreign exchange market into 
the hands of central banks, that assumption is no longer tenable. The 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the switch to flexible exchange 
rates has relieved central banks of the need to maintain fixed parities. 
Although central banks do interfere with competitive forces in foreign 
exchange markets from time to time, a more appropriate assumption under 
current circumstances is that central banks do not intervene in foreign 
exchange markets. 
In the next section, a general equilibrium portfolio adjustment model 
of the Eurodollar market will be presented. Explicit in its development 
will be the assumption that central banks' decisions to place dollars in 
the Eurodollar market are affected by the same types of variables that 
influence private investors' decisions about placement of funds in the 
Eurodollar market. 
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MODEL 
The central assumption underlying the Eurodollar model developed in 
this study is that Eurodollar bankers are auctioneers of short-term dollar 
funds. That is. Eurodollar banks do not possess independent demand and 
supply functions for Eurodollar deposits and loans and, thus, do not exert 
an independent influence on the equilibrium Eurodollar interest rate. 
Instead, the Eurodollar rate adjusts quickly to equate Eurodollar deposits 
and loans. 
A second assumption is that because of maturity matching of assets 
and liabilities. Eurodollar banks do not hold any precautionary reserves. 
What need there may be for precautionary balances is met by maintaining 
standby lines of credit with other banks. Balances held by Eurodollar 
banks with New York banks are viewed as transactions balances and are 
ignored because they are very small relative to Eurodollar deposits. 
It is also assumed that intense competition between Eurodollar banks 
causes the margin between loan and deposit rates to be constant and 
narrow. For convenience, the margin is assumed to be zero. 
The Eurodollar market, then, can be represented in structural form 
as : 
12 3 12 
S + S + S = D + D (29) 
=. F^(W^, RE, RCD, RUK, DM); (30) 
(31) 
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= F^(W^, RE, RCD, RUK, DM): (32) 
= G^(w\ RE, RCP, RLP, DM, UN^ ; (33) 
D^ = G^(W^, RE, RCP, RLP, DM, UN^); (34) 
where 
= stock supply of Eurodollar funds (Eurodollar deposits) held by 
residents of the United States, Canada, and Japan; 
= stock supply of Eurodollar funds (Eurodollar deposits) held by 
residents of Europe and "other" countries; 
S = stock supply of Eurodollar funds (Eurodollar deposits) held by 
central banks; 
D^ = stock demand for Eurodollar funds (Eurodollar loans) by resi­
dents of the United States, Canada, and Japan; 
D = stock demand for Eurodollar funds (Eurodollar loans) by resi­
dents of Europe and "other" countries; 
= total wealth of residents of the United States, Canada, and 
Japan; 
2 
W = total wealth of residents of Europe and "other" countries; 
3 
W = total wealth of central banks; 
RE = rate on three-month Eurodollar deposits (prime banks' bid rate 
in London); 
RCD = rate on three-month negotiable certificates of deposit; 
RUK = covered rate on three-month time deposits with London banks; 
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RCP = rate on three-month prime industrial paper in the U.S.; 
RLP = covered rate on unsecured overdrafts for prime borrowers in 
London ; 
DM = forward premium on deutsche marks in annual percentage terms; 
UN^ = seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for the United States, 
Canada, and Japan ; and 
2 UN = seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for Europe and "other" 
countries. 
The "other" countries referred to above are those countries outside of 
Europe, and excluding the United States, Canada, and Japan, that partici-
2 
pate in the Eurodollar market. In the case of the S variable, the stock 
of Eurodollar funds held by residents of Europe and "other" countries is 
exclusive of holdings of Eurodollar deposits by central banks. 
The stock supplies of and demands for Eurodollar funds are assumed to 
be determined by wealth variables, interest rate variables, and the specu­
lative variable. In addition, the demand for Eurodollar loans is assumed 
to be influenced by the business outlook for which the unemployment rate 
is taken as a proxy. 
The endogenous variables in the model are the stock supplies of and 
demands for Eurodollar funds and the rate of return on Eurodollars. All 
other variables are assumed to be predetermined. This formulation treats 
the Eurodollar market as a subsector of the international financial system 
with interest rates in the United States and Europe determined outside of 
the Eurodollar market. 
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A unique feature of this model is the introduction of an explicit 
central bank demand function for Eurodollar deposits (supply function of 
funds to the Eurodollar market by central banks). Central banks are seen 
as responding to the same set of variables as private investors. The 
asymmetric treatment afforded central banks in the model reflects their 
traditional role as suppliers, but not users, of funds in the Eurodollar 
market (1). 
In order to derive the Eurodollar multiplier from the above struc­
tural model, assume that all predetermined variables are constant, and 
express the equilibrium condition as: 
Now, let "s" represent an autonomous inflow of dollars to the Eurodollar 
market, let ED represent the total volume of Eurodollar deposits, and let 
"m" represent the Eurodollar multiplier. Total differentiating ED + s 
yields: 
S^(RE) + S^(RE) + S^(RE) = D\RE) + D^(RE) . (35) 
_ dED d(S^(RE) + S^(RE) + S^(RE) + s) 
® = di di ds 
(36) 
Simplifying gives: 
3S^ 2^. ^  
9RE 3RE'' ds ' 
(37) 
To find dRE/ds it is necessary to totally differentiate equation (35) with 
respect to the shift parameter which yields: 
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dRE ^  ]_ 
(-35^ 
^3RE 3RE'' ~ ^3RE 
+ 
2 3 
!§_ . asr. 
8RE 3RE' 
(38) 
Substituting equation (38) into equation (37) gives the Eurodollar multi­
plier: 
m = 1 + 
(11.+ 
^ 3RE 3RE 
2 3 
3S , 3S . 
3RE' 
12 12 3 
.3D jD]. 4- ill + 9S 
^3RE 3RE^ ~ ^3RE 3RE 3RE^ 
(39) 
It is apparent that the multiplier is between one and zero, given typical 
assumptions about the signs of the partials. The initial effect of a 
shift of funds from a U.S. commercial bank to a Eurodollar bank will be 
partially offset by secondary effects that result from a decrease in the 
Eurodollar deposit rate. Interest rate leakages cause the "multiplier" to 
be a divisor. 
To determine the value of the multiplier, it is necessary to measure 
the responsiveness of Eurodollar deposits and loans to changes in Euro­
dollar interest rates. The next section reports the results of estima­
tions of the Eurodollar model and calculates the multiplier using the 
derived values of the parameters. 
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RESULTS 
The structural equations of the Eurodollar model were estimated using 
quarterly observations from the fourth quarter of 1974 through the fourth 
quarter of 1980. The time period was chosen because it coincides with the 
post-Bretton Woods period of flexible exchange rates and because it is the 
period for which data is available. 
Data on Eurodollar deposits and liabilities were obtained from the 
Bank for International Settlements (1). The Bank for International 
Settlements lists Eurodollar data provided by banks in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Bank for International 
Settlements' reporting area does not encompass the total Eurodollar 
market, but it does represent a major part of the market. During the 
study period, banks in the Bank for International Settlements' reporting 
area held approximately 70 percent of total Eurodollar liabilities (31). 
Use of the Bank for International Settlements' data is also justified 
since the European segment of the Eurodollar market dominates in deter­
mining Eurodollar interest rates (22). 
The quarterly data used in the estimation were obtained from tables 
entitled "Estimated sources and uses of Euro-currency funds" (1). The 
data is net of interbank deposits except that "the reporting banks them­
selves are considered as original suppliers of Eurocurrency funds to the 
extent that they use funds obtained in domestic currency for switching 
into foreign currency; and similarly they are counted on the uses side of 
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the market to the extent that they use foreign currency funds for 
switching into domestic currency" (20, p. 60). The Bank for International 
Settlements' Eurocurrency data is disaggregated by countries or groups of 
countries. 
As a preliminary step toward estimation, the Eurocurrency deposit 
totals (sources of funds) for the United States, Canada, and Japan were 
combined, as were the deposit totals for Europe and "other" countries. 
Similar aggregations were performed for Eurocurrency loans (uses of 
funds). To convert Eurocurrency totals to Eurodollar totals, a Morgan 
Guaranty quarterly series was used which gives Eurodollars as a percent of 
Eurocurrency liabilities (31). The Morgan Guaranty series has a mean 
value of .758 for the study period with a standard deviation of .027. 
Using the above method to convert Eurocurrency totals to Eurodollar 
totals implies that at any point in time residents of the United States, 
Canada, and Japan in the aggregate maintain the same proportion of Euro­
dollars to Eurocurrency as is maintained by residents of Europe and 
"other" countries in the aggregate. While that assumption would be too 
strong on a microeconomic level, it seems reasonable given the high degree 
of aggregation. 
The Bank for International Settlements in its 1982 report published a 
quarterly series listing Eurodollar holdings of official monetary authori­
ties with banks in the European reporting area. That series was 
subtracted from the series of total Eurodollar deposits held by Europe and 
"other" countries described above. The two resulting series were Euro­
dollar deposits held by official monetary authorities and Eurodollar 
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deposits held by residents of Europe and "other" countries, exclusive of 
holdings of official monetary authorities. 
Unfortunately, the series on Eurodollar holdings of official monetary 
authorities only has observations for the fourth quarter of 1977, the 
fourth quarter of 1978, the four quarters of 1979, and the four quarters 
2 
of 1980. That means observations on S , as calculated above, as well as 
3 2 
S , are not available. The problem of the missing observations on S and 
3 
S is handled by creating an instrumental variable for RE and using 
ordinary least squares techniques to estimate the five structural equa­
tions using all available observations for each equation. 
As Makin notes, "no direct wealth measure is available since the 
exact identity of all Eurodollar depositors is not known" (18, p. 384). 
As a proxy for the wealth of those holding Eurodollar deposits and loans 
in the United States, Canada, and Japan, the combined gross national 
product of the three countries in 1975 dollars and at 1975 exchange rates 
was used. The seasonally adjusted index of industrial production for the 
European members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment was used as a wealth proxy for holders of Eurodollar deposits and 
loans in Europe and "other" countries. The official reserve assets 
(measured in Special Drawing Rights) of the European members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was used as a wealth 
proxy for central banks. 
The unemployment rate for the United States, Canada, and Japan was 
calculated as a weighted average of seasonally adjusted quarterly values 
for each country. The quarterly weights used were the relative shares of 
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combined gross national product measured in 1975 dollars at 1975 exchange 
rates. 
The combined unemployment rate of Italy and the United Kingdom was 
used as a proxy for the unemployment rate for Europe and "other" coun­
tries. The combined unemployment rate was calculated as a weighted 
average of seasonally adjusted quarterly values for both countries. The 
quarterly weights used were the relative shares of combined gross domestic 
product for Italy and the United Kingdom measured in 1975 dollars at 1975 
exchange rates. 
Exchange rate data as well as data relating to the unemployment rates 
and wealth proxies were obtained from Organization for Economic Coopera­
tion and Development publications (10, 17). Interest rate data were 
obtained from Morgan Guaranty publications (31). Covered interest rates 
and the forward premium on deutsche marks were calculated using data from 
both of the above sources. All data were measured at or near end of 
quarter. 
The equations representing the stock demand for Eurodollar deposits 
(supply of funds to the Eurodollar market) were estimated in the form: 
= a^^ + a^gW^ + a^2(RE-RCD) + a^^RUK + a^^DM (40) 
for i = 1 to 3. A priori expectations about the signs of the a^^'s are 
that a^2 and a^^ are positive and that a^^ and a^^ are negative. This 
formulation views United States negotiable certificates of deposit as 
close substitutes for Eurodollar deposits. A change in the difference 
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between those rates will cause portfolio adjustments by investors. The 
demand for Eurodollar deposits will also be affected by the level of 
interest rates on other financial instruments and by investor wealth and 
expectations about future exchange rates. 
The equations representing the stock demand for Eurodollar loans 
(demand for Eurodollar funds) were estimated in the form: 
= b^^ + b^2^ + bj^gCRE-RLP) + b^^RCP + b^^DM + b^^UN^ (41) 
for i = 1 to 2. A priori expectations about the signs of the coefficients 
are that b^^ and b^^ are less than zero and that b^g, b^^, and b^^^ are 
greater than zero. This formulation views loans by London banks to prime 
customers as close substitutes for Eurodollar loans. A change in the 
difference between the Eurodollar rate and the London prime rate (covered) 
will cause portfolio adjustments by holders of Eurodollar loans. The 
demand for Eurodollar loans will also be affected by the level of interest 
rates on other financial instruments, by wealth, by expectations about 
future exchange rates, and by the unemployment rate. 
The complete Eurodollar model consists of the Eurodollar equilibrium 
condition (equation 29) and the five structural equations represented by 
equations (40) and (41). Since the Eurodollar model is a simultaneous-
equation model, it is necessary to determine whether the parameters of all 
of the equations are identified. 
Maddala (16) presents a test for determining whether the rank condi­
tion for identification is met. The test requires the creation of a 
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matrix consisting of all endogenous and predetermined variables in the 
structural equations. Each row of the matrix represents a structural 
equation. For each variable in a row, an "X" is marked if the variable 
appears in the corresponding equation and a "0" is marked if it does not. 
To determine whether a particular equation is identified, delete the row 
corresponding to that equation and pick up the columns associated with the 
elements that have zeros in that row. If G is the number of structural 
equations, then the row (equation) is Identified if the rank of the 
resulting matrix is G-1. The rank test provides a necessary and 
sufficient condition for identification. 
By performing the type of rank test described above, it is possible 
to establish that each of the structural equations in the Eurodollar model 
is identified. The Eurodollar equilibrium equation is identified since it 
is an identity (25). 
The number of predetermined variables excluded from each structural 
equation is greater than the number of included endogenous variables minus 
one. Therefore, by the order condition the system is overidentified 
(25). 
As a preliminary step, ordinary least squares techniques were 
employed to estimate the parameters of the structural equations. Though 
inconsistent (and biased), the resulting estimates provide a useful 
comparison with consistent estimators. Letting DC = RE - RCD and 
DL = RE - RLP, the results (with t-values in parentheses) are given 
below: 
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= -98.18 + .05W^ + 1195.85DC + 123.96RUK - 234.98DM, (42) 
(-6.68) (7.52) (4.37) (3.57) (-4.70) 
D.W. = 1.63, = .948; 
S = 206.84 + -.93W + 5952.34DC + 1260.3RUK - 1726.4DM, (43) 
(.69) (-.34) (2.59) (2.71) (-3.43) 
D.W. = 2.69, R^ = .893; 
= 29.67 + .OOOIW^ + 859.23DC + 180.85RUK - 292.94DM, (44) 
(1.38) (.51) (1.68) (1.21) (-1.61) 
D.W. = 1.73, R^ = .881; 
D^ = -122.18 + .04W^ + 4.97DL + 247.98RCP - 142.12DM 
(-7.30) (7.60) (.23) (10.34) (-4.76) 
+ 707.03UN\ (45) 
(6.89) 
D.W. = 1.73, R^ = .972; 
2 2 
D = -346.50 + 2.42W - 323.17DL + 1314.98RCP - 637.06DM 
(-3.75) (2.22) (-2.00) (7.40) (-2.85) 
+ 3295.29UN^, (46) 
(5.13) 
D.W. = 1.67, R^ = .963. 
To obtain consistent estimators for the parameters of the structural 
equations, an Instrumental variable technique was employed. The struc­
tural equations represented by equations (40) and (41) were substituted 
into equation (29) and the RE variable was solved for In terms of all of 
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the predetermined variables. The resulting equation was estimated using 
ordinary least squares. All 25 observations of each of the predetermined 
variables were used in the instrumental variable estimation process. The 
following equation gives the results of the reduced form estimation for 
RE; 
RE = -.0190 + .OOOOIW^ - .0002W^ - .OOOOOOIW^ - .0275DM 
(-.55) (.37) (-.50) (-.14) (-.37) 
1.1857RCD - .0081RCP - .0921RUK + .0545RLP + .2137UN^ 
(10.59) (-.10) (-1.01) (.68) (1.41) 
+ .OniUN^, (47) 
(.13) 
D.W. = 2.13, R^ = .999. 
The predicted values of RE from equation (47) were substituted for 
the actual values of RE and the structural equations of the model were 
reestimated using ordinary least squares. If ^  is the predicted value of 
RE and if DC^ = (RE - RCD) and DL^ = (RE - RLP), then the results of the 
estimation using the instrumental variable are: 
1 1 z 
s = -102.81 + .05W + 1757.37DC + 93.17RUK- 240.9DM, (48) 
(-9.19) (10.22) (6.95) (3.40) (-6.37) 
D.W. = 2.03, R^ = .970; 
= 577.69 - 3.81W^ + 13620.06DC^ + 233,77RUK - 1187.98DM, (49) 
(1.91) (-1.46) (3.35) (.3;) (-2.45) 
D.W. = 2.65, R^ = .923; 
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= 39.97 + .00007W^ + 1793.66DC^ + 55.79RUK - 229.71DM, (50) 
(1.78) (.34) (2.02) (.38) (-1.42) 
D.W. = 2.04, = .897; 
= -121.88 + .04W^ + 4.24DL= + 248.38RCP - 142.6DM 
(-7.28) (7.57) (.19) (10.34) (-4.77) 
+ 705.96UN\ (51) 
( 6 . 8 8 )  
D.W. = 1.74, R^ =» .972; 
= -345.25 + 2.42W^ - 333.88DL^ + 1318.8RCP - 644.17DM 
(-3.76) (2.23) (-2.08) (7.47) (-2.90) 
+ 3282.22UN^, (52) 
(5.14) 
D.W. = 1.66, R^ = .963. 
Since the Durbin-Watson test statistic lies in its indeterminate 
range for equations (49)-(52) the ordinary least squares residuals were 
computed for each of the four equations and regressed against their one-
period lagged values. None of the resulting t-values for the first-order 
autoregressive parameters was significant even at the .10 level, 
indicating that the hypothesis of first-order autocorrelation should be 
rejected. 
In equations (48)-(50) which represent the demand for Eurodollar 
deposits, all of the coefficients except the ones on the RUK variable and 
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the one on W have the anticipated signs. The positive sign on the RUK 
variable indicates that an increase in the covered rate on three-month 
London time deposits increases the stock demand for Eurodollar deposits. 
A possible explanation for the sign might be that since London is the 
major center for Eurodollar banking activity, higher covered rates on 
London time deposits attract funds from throughout the world (particularly 
the United States, Canada, and Japan), some of which go into the London 
Eurodollar market. Sterling funds may be converted to dollars by London 
banks and placed in Eurodollar accounts. 
All of the coefficients in equation (48) are highly significant. 
However, the coefficients on the wealth proxies and the RUK variables in 
equations (49) and (50) are not significant. The coefficients on the 
other independent variables in equation (49) are statistically significant 
at the .05 level. The coefficients on DC^and DM are significant in 
equation (50) at the .10 and .22 levels, respectively. 
2 
The fact that the coefficient on W in equation (49) is negative and 
not statistically significant may indicate that the index of industrial 
production is not a good proxy for the wealth of those residents of Europe 
and "other" countries that hold Eurodollar deposits. Since the coeffi­
cient on in equation (52) is significant and does carry the anticipated 
2 
sign it may be that the results for W in equation (49) are due to the 
limited number of observations available. 
The results for equation (50) give mild support for the proposition 
that central banks react to the same interest rate and speculative 
variables as private investors. The strongest result is that central 
banks increase their holdings of Eurodollar deposits when Eurodollar rates 
increase relative to rates on United States certificates of deposit. 
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Equation (50) also gives strong indications that central bank holdings of 
Eurodollar deposits are not related to their holdings of official 
reserves. 
It might be that the official reserve holdings of European countries 
is too broad a measure to use as a proxy for the wealth of the central 
banks that participate in the Eurodollar market. The foreign reserve 
holdings of a particular central bank may correspond much more closely to 
that central bank's holdings of Eurodollars. Since data is not available 
for individual central banks, only the broad proposition can be tested. 
The results of equation (50) might also be improved by incorporating 
variables into the equation which reflect restrictions on central bank 
activities imposed by particular countries. As with equation (49), the 
results for equation (50) must be viewed with caution, given the number of 
observations. 
The assumptions underlying this model of the Eurodollar market do not 
suggest that the RUK variable should be dropped from equation (50), but if 
it is then interesting results occur. Estimating equation (50) without 
the RUK variables yields: 
3 3 z 
S =• 37.74 + .OOOIW + 1912.05DC - 176.43DM, (50') 
(1.88) (.67) (2.48) (-2.43) 
D.W. = 1.99, = .894 
with both DC and DM significant at the .05 level. 
Results from equation (48) indicate that a one percent increase in 
z 1 
DC will cause a .37 percent increase in S . Equations (49) and (50) 
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indicate that a one percent increase in DC^ will cause a .56 percent 
2 3 
increase in S and a .27 percent increase in S . 
All of the variables in equation (51) are highly significant except 
DL^. Apparently, the stock demand for Eurodollar loans by residents of 
the United States, Canada, and Japan is not influenced by the differential 
between the Eurodollar rate and the London prime rate. All of the 
estimated coefficients in equation (52) are significant at the .05 level. 
Participants in the Eurodollar market in both regional aggregates react 
significantly to higher costs of funds in the United States (proxied by 
RCP) by increasing their borrowing from the Eurodollar market. 
The signs of the coefficients on the DM variable in equations (51) 
and (52) are different than anticipated. One might expect that anticipa­
tions of a lower value of the dollar would lead to increased borrowing of 
Eurodollars. Negative coefficients on DM may indicate that anticipations 
of a fall in the value of the dollar lead to increased taking of loans 
from United States' banks at the expense of Eurodollar banks. 
If high levels of unemployment are associated with tight credit 
conditions in local credit markets, then an increase in the unemployment 
rate may lead to increased borrowing from the Eurodollar market and less 
borrowing from domestic credit markets. Such an explanation is consistent 
1 2 
with a positive coefficient on UN and UN in equations (51) and (52) , in 
which case the unemployment rate is a proxy for credit conditions rather 
than for business confidence. 
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Results from equation (52) indicate that a one percent increase in 
the absolute value of DL^ (a lowering of the RÈ relative to RLP) would 
2 
cause a .003 percent increase in D . Equation (51) indicates that a one 
percent increase in the absolute value of DL^ would cause a .0002 percent 
decrease in D^. 
Taking partial derivatives of equations (48)-(52) with respect to RE 
yields values that can be substituted into equation (39) to determine the 
Eurodollar interest rate multiplier. Substituting estimated values of the 
partials into equation (39) gives a Eurodollar multiplier equal to .019. 
This value is much lower than other estimates but is generally consistent 
with Niehans' and Hewson's (24) contention that very little liquidity can 
be created by the Eurodollar market. Dropping the partial derived from 
equation (51) does not change the value of the multiplier since that 
partial is so low relative to the others. 
Part of the explanation for the low value of the multiplier is the 
interest rate sensitivity of central bank holdings of Eurodollar deposits. 
If the partial derived from equation (50) is also dropped from the deter­
mination of the multiplier, then the multiplier would have a value of 
.021.  
The low value of the multiplier can also be attributed to the high 
responsiveness of Eurodollar deposits in Europe and "other" countries to 
changes in the Eurodollar rate. However, even if 3S /9RÈ was excluded 
from equation (43) (with 3S^/3RÈ included) the multiplier would be less 
than ,10 in value. 
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The main reason that the multiplier has a low value is because the 
responsiveness of the demand for Eurodollar loans to changes in the Euro­
dollar rate is low relative to the responsiveness of the demand for Euro­
dollar deposits to changes in the Eurodollar rate. An autonomous shift of 
dollars into the Eurodollar market will cause a decrease in the Eurodollar 
rate which will induce a large decrease in the demand for Eurodollar 
deposits. However, the lower Eurodollar rate will cause only a relatively 
small increase in the demand for Eurodollar loans so the overall impact on 
the value of Eurodollar deposits will be very low. 
If equations (42)-(46) are used to supply estimates of the partials 
employed in equation (39), then the resulting multiplier has a value of 
.038. The value of the multiplier derived using the original ordinary 
least squares estimates is twice as large as the multiplier implied by the 
instrumental variable estimates, though it is still very low. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The estimated coefficients of the structural parameters in equations 
(48)-(52) suggest that the Eurodollar interest rate multiplier is very 
low. That implies that the ability of the Eurodollar market to grow 
through multiple deposit expansion is very limited If exchange rates are 
flexible and central banks do not intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets. Therefore, the growth of the Eurodollar market must be explained 
in terms of the interest rates and credit facilities offered investors and 
by the ability of the Eurodollar banks to act as brokers of short-term 
funds, attracting funds from surplus areas and distributing them to 
deficit areas. Much of the growth of the Eurodollar market may be due to 
the role that Eurodollar banks play in lowering the risk involved in 
transactions between ultimate borrowers and ultimate lenders of funds, and 
in lowering the risk inherent in international trade under a flexible 
exchange rate system. 
If the Eurodollar multiplier is as low as suggested by this study, 
then the Eurodollar market cannot be a source of global inflation, and 
will in fact exert a stabilizing influence on the world financial struc­
ture. For instance, a sudden withdrawal of funds from the Eurodollar 
market would cause Eurodollar rates to rise which would induce a signifi­
cant increase in the placement of new dollar funds in the market, and 
would cause a lesser decrease in demand for Eurodollar loans. Very little 
liquidity would be destroyed by the initial withdrawal of funds from the 
Eurodollar market. 
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The results also lend mild support to the contention that central 
banks react to the same set of interest rate and speculative variables as 
private investors. On the other hand, the results offer no support to the 
belief that central banks maintain a constant fraction of their foreign 
reserves in the form of Eurodollar deposits. The results concerning 
central banks' demand for Eurodollar deposits must be accepted with a 
considerable amount of caution, given the paucity of available data on 
central banks' holdings of Eurodollars. 
The overall empirical results are good, given the degree of aggrega­
tion and the lack of precision in measuring holdings of Eurodollar 
deposits and loans. The results give strong support to the proposition 
that participants in the Eurodollar market are sensitive to changes in 
interest rates. Given the flexibility of Eurodollar rates, it seems very 
unlikely that investors will hold a fixed proportion of Eurodollar 
deposits to total dollar assets. A model developed according to fixed 
coefficient assumptions will give an inaccurate picture of the Eurodollar 
market. Explicit portfolio choice by participants in the Eurodollar 
market must be acknowledged. 
The present model could be improved by developing a microeconomic 
foundation that allows for the specification of aggregate demand functions 
for Eurodollar deposits and loans based on utility-maximizing criteria. 
Making the Eurodollar model dynamic would also be an Improvement on the 
current models. 
More sophisticated research techniques are also dependent upon 
improvements in the accuracy and comprehensiveness of Eurodollar data 
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collection. Particularly lacking is data concerning Eurodollar trans­
actions at the raicroeconomic level. Hopefully, the availability of data 
will increase over time and additional studies will help to resolve the 
issues relating to the functioning of the Eurodollar market. 
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SECTION III. SOIL EROSION UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
POLICY AND ENERGY CONSTRAINTS 
Of concern to farmers, consumers, and policymakers alike is soil 
erosion and the related problem of nonpoint source pollution. Nonpoint 
source (NFS) pollution is that pollution that cannot be characterized as 
entering the environment at a particular point from a specific source. 
Point source pollution is the kind of pollution typically referred to 
in classroom discussions of externalities. A factory smokestack belching 
pollution into the air, or waste from a chemical plant flowing through a 
sewer pipe into a river, are images of point source pollution. In both 
cases, the source and point of entry of the pollution are readily 
apparent. NFS pollution enters the environment in a diffuse manner. For 
instance, two farms may lie on a hill—one above the other. Both farms 
may contribute to the pollution of a stream at the base of the hill, but 
it may not be obvious exactly where each farm's pollution enters the 
waterway or to what extent each farm contributes to the pollution of the 
stream. 
The NFS pollution this study is concerned with is that which arises 
as a derivative of agricultural production. The primary type of NFS 
pollution is soil erosion. Soil erodes when rain washes soil from fields 
into waterways. Modern tillage systems that break up the soil, or turn 
the soil over prior to planting, leave the fields particularly vulnerable 
to soil erosion. Once the soil enters the waterways, it degrades the 
aquatic habitat and directly reduces the recreational value of the 
streams. 
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Two other types of NFS pollution that are related to farm production 
are fertilizers and pesticides. Once in waterways, fertilizers encourage 
and enhance algae growth. When pesticides are washed into waterways, they 
may pose direct health hazards if the water is consumed by humans, or 
indirect health hazards if humans eat fish that contain amounts of the 
pesticides. Water treatment plants that draw water from rivers that are 
polluted with pesticides must purchase charcoal filters to prevent the 
pesticides from entering the community drinking water. 
In order to improve stream water quality, it is necessary to reduce 
soil erosion and the amount of fertilizers and pesticides entering the 
waterways. Since sediment acts to some extent as a transport mechanism 
for fertilizers and pesticides (10, p. 3), the primary type of NFS pollu­
tion considered in this study will be soil erosion. It will be assumed 
throughout this analysis that a decrease in soil erosion that results from 
changes in agricultural production techniques will bring about an improve­
ment in stream water quality. It is hoped that this study will provide 
policymakers with better information on which to base NFS pollution 
control policies. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Interest among economists about nonpoint source pollution and its 
control is relatively recent, but some useful studies of the problem have 
been conducted. Before reviewing specific studies, it is advantageous to 
discuss two common procedures that are employed in studies of nonpoint 
source pollution. 
The first point that should be noted is that each of the studies 
reported here made use of the universal soil loss equation to estimate the 
amount of gross soil erosion arising under alternative cropping practices. 
The universal soil loss equation is a model that predicts long-run average 
annual erosion according to the equation: 
E = PKAoytt, (1) 
where E = soil loss in tons per acre per year; 
p = rainfall/runoff factor; 
K = soil erodibility factor; 
X = slope-length factor; 
a = slope-steepness factor; 
Y = cover and management factor; and 
IT = practice factor. 
The parameter p measures the frequency and erosivity of rainfall in a 
given location, k measures how readily a soil erodes. Its value will 
depend on the physical properties of the soil. The product of \ and a is 
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the topographical factor and in part determines the amount of sediment 
that will be carried away. 
The product picXa is an estimate of the tons per acre of soil that 
would erode from a specific field during the course of a year if the field 
was continuously fallow. The cover and management factor y gives the 
ratio of soil loss from land cropped under particular conditions to the 
soil loss that would occur if the field was clean-tilled and continuously 
fallow. The value of y will vary depending upon crop sequence, residue, 
and tillage practices, and upon the stage of development of crop cover at 
which rainfall occurs. The parameter tr gives the ratio of soil loss with 
a specific support practice to the corresponding soil loss with straight 
row tillage. A common support practice is contour tillage.^ 
The second point regarding common procedures used in NFS studies 
involves the type of erosion control policies considered. The most 
frequently analyzed erosion control policies are gross soil loss restric­
tions and soil loss taxes. 
Soil loss restrictions establish per acre limits on the amount of 
soil erosion from farmland permitted during a given period of time. In 
effect, they limit a farmer's choice of production methods to those which 
generate an amount of soil erosion that is less than or equal to the 
specified level. 
Soil loss taxes take the form of charges imposed on farmers for each 
ton of soil that erodes from farmland during a particular period of time. 
more detailed discussion of the universal soil loss equation is 
provided in a U.S. Department of Agriculture publication (17). 
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If "c" is the per ton charge, and if E® is the number of tons that erode 
from an acre of farmland, then cE® is the per acre tax that the farmer 
is assessed. 
One of the unique features of the present study is that soil erosion 
abatement subsidies are considered rather than soil erosion taxes. A 
subsidy program allows for the payment of a specific amount of money to 
farmers for each ton of soil erosion abated from the current or "baseline" 
level. If "s" is the per ton subsidy, if E^ is the baseline erosion (in 
tons) on an acre of farmland, and if E® is the actual erosion (in tons) 
on the acre of farmland, then s(E^ - E®) is the per acre subsidy paid 
to the farmer. 
The per acre subsidy can be divided into a fixed payment (sE^) and 
a per acre tax (sE®). If s = c, then the subsidy and tax will differ 
only by the fixed amount. In general, the subsidy policy will have the 
same efficiency Implications as the tax policy if the fixed payment can be 
made Independent of the farmer's behavior (16). That condition is met by 
the linear programming model developed in the next section.^ 
The equity implications of a soil loss abatement policy will differ 
from those associated with a soil loss tax policy. Erosion abatement 
subsidies will benefit farmers at the expense of consumers, while soil 
loss taxes will benefit consumers at the expense of farmers. 
^The number of farms in the study area is fixed and the size of 
each farm is fixed. Also, the baseline level of erosion is directly 
observable. 
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Important practical reasons exist for considering soil loss abatement 
subsidies rather than soil loss taxes. An unwritten rule of political 
economy is that those most directly affected by a policy will react most 
intensively to it. Farmers would be directly affected by any type of 
erosion control policy, and would strongly oppose attempts to establish a 
program involving soil erosion charges. While the effect on farmers would 
be direct, the benefits to consumers of soil loss taxes would be diffuse. 
Given the political importance of farmers, it seems highly unlikely that a 
charges policy will ever be seriously considered. It appears that the 
implementation of a soil erosion abatement subsidy policy would be much 
more likely than the implementation of a soil loss tax policy. 
The effects of alternative NFS pollution control policies can be 
analyzed at many levels of aggregation. Three studies give insight into 
the economic impacts of soil erosion control policy on agricultural 
production. The first study focuses on crop production in the Corn Belt, 
the second on crop production in a regional watershed, and the third on 
agricultural production on individual farms. 
Taylor and Frohberg (20) used a linear programming model of crop 
production in the Corn Belt to examine the partial equilibrium welfare 
effects of alternative NFS pollution control policies. Cropland in the 
study area was divided into 11 soil aggregates within each of 17 
geographical areas in the Corn Belt. The model did not allow for live­
stock production but did allow for production and sale of corn, soybeans, 
wheat, oats, hay, and pasture. Allowable cropping activities in each soil 
aggregate consisted of fall or spring moldboard plowing or chisel plowing; 
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straight row, contouring, or terracing practices; and an average of 11 
different crop rotations. The objective function of the linear 
programming model was the maximization of consumers' and producers' 
surplus in the corn and soybean markets minus the total variable cost of 
producing a given amount of wheat, oats, hay, and pasture. To represent 
the demand side of the model, Taylor and Frohberg used stepped demand 
functions for corn and soybeans which they subjectively specified. 
Taylor and Frohberg first solved the model without any pollution 
policy imposed in order to find a baseline for comparison purposes. They 
then estimated the partial welfare effects of a number of alternative NFS 
pollution control policies.^ The policies they considered that are of 
primary interest in terms of the present study are gross soil loss 
restrictions and soil loss taxes. 
Taylor and Frohberg found that either a soil loss restriction of 
5 tons/acre or a soil loss tax of $l/ton would reduce soil erosion in the 
Corn Belt by about 2.44 tons/acre (a 45 percent decrease). The soil loss 
restriction reduces the amount of corn and soybeans produced in the study 
The welfare effects are partial since they take account of the 
change in the sum of producers' and consumers' surplus resulting from the 
production and consumption of corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, hay, and 
pasture, but not the environmental benefits derived from NFS pollution 
abatement or the administrative cost of the abatement policies. Taylor 
and Frohberg calculate the change in consumers' surplus for corn and 
soybeans as (Fg, "^Bi^^^Bi Qri)/2, where Fg and Qg are the baseline 
price and quantity oemanded, Fp and are the price and quantity demanded 
in those model solutions associated with the policy under consideration, 
and "i" is corn and soybeans. The change in consumers' surplus for wheat, 
oats, hay, or pasture is calculated as (Fg^ - PRj[)QBi» where "1" 
represents one of the four crops. The change in consumers' surplus 
associated with a particular erosion control policy is the sum of the 
changes in consumers' surplus for each of the crops. 
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area. The soil loss tax increases corn production and decreases soybean 
production. Assuming that the net social cost of a policy can be measured 
by the change in producers' plus consumers' surplus, the welfare cost of 
the 5 tons/acre policy would be $201 million, while the $l/ton tax would 
have a welfare cost of $108 million. While a soil loss tax policy 
appeared to be the socially least costly way of achieving a particular 
level of soil loss, Taylor and Frohberg found that for reductions of soil 
loss from the baseline of up to 33 percent, the soil loss restriction 
policy was only slightly less efficient than the tax policy. 
The two policies do have significant equity differences. A soil 
loss restriction of 5 tons/acre would increase producers' surplus by 
$232 million (and decrease consumers' surplus by $433 million), while a 
$l/ton soil loss tax would decrease producers' surplus by $722 million 
(and increase consumers' surplus by $286 million and raise $328 million in 
tax revenue). 
Alt and Heady (1) used a linear programming model to analyze the 
impacts of alternative soil erosion restrictions on the costs of field 
crop production in a 900,000 acre watershed of the Iowa River. They 
proceeded by dividing farmland into nine distinct soil aggregates, and 
building a model of crop production for each aggregate. No livestock 
production was allowed to occur in any aggregate, but each aggregate was 
allowed to produce continuous corn, corn-beans rotations, or rotations 
that combined corn, beans, oats, and meadow. Tillage practices were 
assumed to consist of spring or fall moldboard plowing, rotary-till plant­
ing, or no-till planting. Additionally, farmers in each aggregate were 
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allowed the option of contour planting or terracing. The objective func­
tion of the model was the minimization of the total cost of producing 
specified levels of output in the watershed. These specified levels 
represented projected output levels in the study area. Although separate 
models of crop production were built for each soil aggregate, the Alt and 
Heady programming model treated the whole watershed as if it was one farm. 
To determine the characteristics of farm production in the study area 
in the absence of soil loss policy, a baseline solution was computed. The 
results of the baseline solution indicated that production of row crops 
would occur in only four of the nine soil aggregates, and that the only 
cropping practice used in the watershed would be fall moldboard plowing 
with straight row planting. 
Programming solutions of the model were obtained for three different 
levels of soil loss restrictions: 10 tons/acre, 5 tons/acre, and 
3 tons/acre. The results indicated that the 10 tons/acre limit would be 
met primarily by contouring and switching from fall to spring moldboard 
plowing. The 5 tons/acre and 3 tons/acre limits induced a switch to 
rotary-till and no-till planting, and brought about a dramatic increase in 
the number of acres terraced. While the 10 tons/acre erosion limit caused 
costs of production in the watershed to rise by only 2.5 percent, the cost 
of meeting tighter standards was considerably higher. Imposition of a 
3 tons/acre soil loss standard caused the cost of production in the water­
shed to increase by over $10.5 million (16.8 percent). 
McGrann and Meyer (13) evaluated the farm level economic impacts of 
soil erosion control policy by constructing models of farms that are 
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representative of the farms located in three major soil association areas 
in Iowa. The representative farms for two of the soil associations were 
assumed to have 320 acres of cropland each, and the representative farm 
for the third soil association was assumed to consist of 240 acres of 
cropland. Each farm was allowed to conduct farrow-to-finish hog opera­
tions, cow-calf operations, and cattle feeding enterprises. Additionally, 
each farm could plant continuous corn, corn-bean rotations, corn-oats-
meadow combinations, or continuous meadow. The cropping practice 
alternatives available to each representative farm consisted of moldboard 
or chisel plowing, and straight row planting, contouring, or terracing. 
Linear programming techniques were used to select the rotation and 
cropping practices that maximized net income for each farm. 
McGrann and Meyer developed a baseline solution for each farm by 
requiring that each farm use moldboard plowing and straight row planting. 
They then imposed soil loss restrictions of 15, 10, 5 and 2 tons/acre on 
the farms. The results indicated that a 5 tons/acre limit would cause 
farm income to fall by $10,068 (30 percent) on one farm, and by $2,365 
(4 percent) on another farm. A 5 tons/acre soil loss restriction would 
not cause any change in income on the third farm since its gross erosion 
in the baseline solution was less than 5 tons/acre. This suggests that 
the inequities associated with a uniform soil loss restriction policy 
would be substantial. 
To determine whether the inclusion of livestock operations on the 
representative farms mitigated the income-reducing impact of soil loss 
policy, they imposed the soil loss restrictions on the farms and ran the 
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program with the livestock operations excluded. Their finding was that 
the existence of livestock operations on farms tends to mitigate part of 
the detrimental impact on income of soil loss restrictions. 
These studies indicate some of the ways in which the economic impacts 
of alternative NFS pollution control policies can be analyzed. While 
interesting and useful, these approaches ignore the need to coordinate NFS 
pollution control policy with shifting relative costs of agricultural 
inputs. 
One important input whose relative price is likely to change over the 
next ten to fifteen years is energy. The impact of changes in the rela­
tive price of energy will be manifested directly in changing fuel bills 
for farmers and indirectly in changing costs for farm inputs—fertilizers, 
herbicides, pesticides, and machinery. The change in energy costs will 
have an impact on the choice of farm production techniques and, therefore, 
on soil erosion and stream water quality. 
One study of the effects of higher energy prices on farm production 
was conducted by Forster and Rask (6). They attempted to determine the 
impact of rising energy prices on the choice of tillage systems on Ohio 
farms. To do so, they constructed one representative farm for each of 
three different soil types common to Ohio cropland. Each farm was assumed 
to consist of 600 acres of cropland—half of which was planted in corn and 
the other half in soybeans. No livestock production was allowed to occur 
on any of the farms. Linear programming techniques were used to find for 
each farm the returns above variable costs associated with three 
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alternative tillage systems. The tillage systems that Forster and Rask 
considered were moldboard plowing, chisel plowing, and no-till planting. 
In the baseline solution of the model, Forster and Rask found the net 
return associated with each tillage system on each farm with energy prices 
at their 1976 levels. Their baseline results showed that no-till planting 
gave the highest net return for the first two farms, while moldboard 
plowing yielded the highest net return on the third farm. 
They then considered four alternative energy price scenarios and the 
impact they would have on net returns under each tillage system on each 
farm. The alternative price scenarios allowed for a 50 percent or a 100 
percent increase in energy prices in the short-run, and a 50 percent or 
100 percent increase in energy prices in the long-run. According to their 
assumptions, in the short-run only fuel and nitrogen fertilizer prices are 
responsive to increases in energy prices; while in the long-run the prices 
of all Inputs would be affected by higher energy prices. Solving the 
model for each price scenario, Forster and Rask found that higher energy 
prices have an almost identical impact on the profitability of the various 
tillage systems. For all energy price scenarios, no-till planting still 
yielded the highest net returns on the first two farms, while moldboard 
plowing still gave the highest net return on the third farm. These 
results indicated that higher energy prices would have little impact on 
the choice of tillage systems. 
Effective public policy, aimed at reducing NFS pollution, requires a 
more complete understanding of the relationship between the costs of farm 
fuel and energy-related inputs and the level of NFS pollution that is 
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generated in the production process, than that provided by the Forster and 
Rask study. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the impacts of 
higher energy prices on soil erosion and on the effectiveness of NFS 
pollution control policies. This is accomplished by evaluating the impact 
of higher energy prices on soil erosion in the absence of NFS pollution 
control policies and in the presence of different NFS control policies. 
The use of rising energy prices in the study is justified for two 
reasons. First, political instability in the Fersian Gulf and world-wide 
recovery from recession will likely combine to bring about an increase in 
energy prices. Second, the results indicate that the major impact of 
rising energy prices on NFS pollution and pollution control policy will 
occur with only moderate increases in energy prices. 
The next section presents a theoretical framework within which all 
production models are constructed. Attention is then given to the 
development of the specific model used in this analysis. 
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MODEL 
In general, the role of a producer in an economic system is to choose 
a plan of action that optimizes some objective function, given the 
information available to the producer at that time. The most common 
objective that producers are assumed to maximize is the firm's net 
revenue, or profit. The information that guides the producer's choices 
consists of knowledge of technological relationships between inputs and 
outputs, knowledge of prices of inputs and outputs, and knowledge of any 
physical or political constraints that limit the extent that an input can 
be used or a particular technology employed. 
In the context of modern economic theory, the sum of a producer's 
knowledge of feasible production processes can be represented by a produc­
tion set. Let "W" consist of all production vectors that are feasible for 
the firm. One such production vector, w, specifies a particular trans­
formation of inputs into outputs with the outputs appearing as positive 
numbers and the inputs appearing as negative numbers. For sake of 
economic analysis, it is usually assumed that the producer's choice set is 
closed and convex, and that the production processes are additive (3, 
pp. 39-41). 
The production set will be closed if it contains all of its boundary 
points (11, p. 15). Assuming that w^ and w^ are both elements of W 
1 2 
and that 0 ^  v ^  1, then W is convex if vw + (l-v)w is also an element 
of W. The production processes are additive if, when two processes are 
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Independently possible, they are also jointly possible. If the null 
vector is an element of W, then additivity and convexity imply constant 
returns to scale (3, p. 42). 
If certain crucial inputs are available to the producer in fixed 
amounts, then the production set may be bounded. That is, it will be 
possible to specify a hypercube sufficiently large to contain all of the 
points in the producer's choice set (11, p. 14). If the production set is 
closed and bounded, then it is said to be compact (11, p. 15). 
Let "q" represent a vector of input and output prices. In order to 
maximize profits, a producer will choose a w* such that q*w* is a 
maximum. If the production set is compact, then w* will lie in the 
boundary of W; and a supporting hyperplane, normal to the price vector, 
will pass through w* (3, p. 43). 
Although the theory of the firm in its generalized version is very 
elegant, it is necessary to use a more specific formalization in order to 
construct models that allow for computations. To this end, economists can 
choose between models that make use of neoclassical production functions 
(which usually allow for large substitutability among inputs), and fixed 
coefficient models of which linear programming is one example (12, 
p. 45). 
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A Neoclassical Production Model 1 
A general neoclassical production function for farm output might be 
expressed as: 
where X = the quantity of aggregate farm output; 
= the quantity of the aggregate capital input; 
Zg = the quantity of the aggregate labor input; and 
Zj = the quantity of the aggregate energy input. 
It is assumed that the production function is continuous and has continu­
ous first and second-order partial derivatives. 
According to the neoclassical theory of the firm, a farm entrepreneur 
will seek to maximize his or her net farm income, or profits. If "P" is 
the unit price of output, if , and are the unit prices of the 
farm inputs, and if "I" is the farm net Income (profit), then the entre­
preneur's profit function can be represented as; 
X = h(Z^, Zg, Z^) ( 2 )  
(3) 
or 
I . p-h(2^, Z3) - CjZj - CjZj - C3Z3. (4) 
^This subsection is based on the neoclassical production model 
presented by Henderson and Quandt (8). 
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The entrepreneur will select , and to maximize the profit func­
tion. The first-order conditions for profit maximization are: 
p-hz^ - = 0, (5) 
P h - C„ = 0, and 
h  ^  
( 6 )  
P - C, . 0. (7) 
Second-order conditions for profit maximization require that: 
P'h , P'h „ , P'h < 0, 
1 1 2 2 3 3 
( 8 )  
\\ \\ 
\\ 
, P , P 
^^2^2 ^^2^3 
>  0 ,  (9) 
and 
\ z ^  "ZjZ, \ z ^  
\ \  \ \  \ s  
\\ \h 
< 0 .  (10)  
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A change in relative input prices will induce the entrepreneur to 
adjust the quantity of each input used. To examine the effects of a 
change in input prices, it is necessary to totally differentiate equations 
(5) - (7). Differentiating totally and expressing in matrix form yields: 
2 P'h 2 P'h 
FX 2 Z ^*^Z Z 
2 1 2 2 2 3 
""Vl '"'^ 3^ 2 
dZ, dC, - h„ dP 
1 
dC, - h^^dP 
dC, - h,^dP 
(11) 
Now let 
A = P~ 
\ h  \ \  \^3 
\ \  \ \  \ h  
( 1 2 )  
Using Cramer's rule, it is easy to show that an increase in the price 
of an input will always reduce the usage of that input. For instance, the 
impact of higher energy prices on energy use is given by: 
3C, 
\ \  \ s  
\ h  \ \  (13) 
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Equation (13) implies that the own-price effect will be unambiguously 
negative if the second-order conditions are met. 
The impact of higher energy prices on the amount of labor employed is 
given by: 
-P 
2^ 
3C, (14) 
Equation (14) indicates that the sign of depends on the signs of 
the cross partials of the production function. A common assumption in 
microeconomics is that the cross partials have positive values. If so, 
higher energy prices will cause a decrease in labor usage, given that the 
second-order conditions are met. 
Assuming that h is greater than zero, the sign of 9Z /9C„ will be 
h h  ^  3 
unambiguously positive only if h and h are both less than zero. 
2 3 13 
However, it is unlikely that h and h would both be less than 
2 3 %1%3 
zero. 
It seems reasonable to assume that for most cases the cross partials 
of the production function will be positive. If the cross partials are 
positive, an increase in the price of an input will cause a decrease in 
the use of other inputs. Since the own-price effect is also negative, it 
follows that an increase in the price of an input will decrease the 
quantity of farm output. 
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Examination of the neoclassical production model provides insight 
into the behavior of entrepreneurs. However, a neoclassical production 
function for farm output is not directly known, and it is usually much 
easier to conduct empirical studies of agricultural production by 
employing linear programming techniques. A linear programming model is a 
workable alternative to the neoclassical model, but its use carries with 
it a number of limitations. A major drawback of linear programming 
production models is that they allow limited possibilities for substitu­
tion among inputs. This limitation is particularly serious when input 
price changes are large and occur over a long period of time, or when the 
production process allows rapid adjustment in relative input levels. 
The use of linear programming models of farm production is partially 
justified because substitution among farm inputs is somewhat restricted in 
the short-run. Typically, a farmer owns an equipment set which consists 
of a tractor and a particular set of implements that are compatible with 
the tractor. The farmer's production decision is the extent to which he 
or she will use the type of equipment set he or she owns in the production 
of a limited choice of outputs. Since one worker is required to operate 
the tractor and accessories, the farmer is limited in making capital-labor 
substitutions—at least in the short run. 
Although a farm production function is not directly observable, 
various farm production processes are. Linear programming is a convenient 
way of making use of knowledge of farm production processes to answer 
empirical questions about production decisions. It is ideally suited to 
show the impacts of physical constraints (amounts of land), and policy 
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constraints (soil loss restrictions), on farm decisions. The number of 
production processes available to farmers is limited. The addition of an 
assumption of linearity to the previous assumptions about production sets 
is sufficient to allow the linear programming approach to be used (4, 
p. 81). 
A Linear Programming Model^ 
To examine how pollution control policy is affected by prevailing 
energy prices, a linear programming model of farm production was developed 
for that part of the Iowa River Basin that lies above the Coralville 
Reservoir. The study area consists of approximately 1,899,600 acres of 
cropland and 61,400 acres of permanent pasture lying in all or part of 
Benton, Cerro Cordo, Franklin, Grundy, Hamilton, Hancock, Hardin, Iowa, 
Johnson, Linn, Marshall, Poweshiek, Tama and Wright counties in Iowa. 
This part of the Iowa River Basin encompasses farmland that ranges from 
gently sloping prairie in North Central Iowa to steeply sloped hills in 
Eastern Iowa. 
For purposes of this study, the farmland was aggregated into nine 
basic soil areas according to agronomic and physical characteristics of 
the soils. Table III-l shows the relationship between the study aggre­
gates used in this analysis and the Soil Association Area designations 
made by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. Table III-l also lists the 
^Tom Penton, Mark Wall, Jerry Gogan, and Ted Hall were helpful in 
providing some of the technical data used in constructing the coefficients 
of the programming model. Klaus Alt, Jim Shortle, and Mike Monson made 
useful suggestions relating to construction of the model. 
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Table III-l. Soil type composition of study aggregates^ 
Soil 
Study association Soil type Normalized 
aggregate area and slope percent 
1 11 108A Wadena L (14) 
559A Ta1cot CL (26) 
138B1 Clarion L (30) 
87A Colo-Zook CP (30) 
2 12,14,17,18 507A Canisteo SICL (22) 
55A Nicollet L (22) 
107A Webster SICL (19) 
138B1 Clarion L (22) 
138C2 Clarion L (12) 
3 13,117 107A Webster SICL (46) 
138B1 Clarion L (27) 
138C2 Clarion L (14) 
138D2 Clarion L (6) 
62E2 Sturden L (7) 
4 15 107A Webster SICL (29) 
55A Nicollet L (32) 
138B1 Clarion L (29) 
138C2 Clarion L (10) 
5 7 87A Colo-Zook CP (38) 
178A Waukee L (17) 
220A Nodaway SIL (10) 
315A Alluvial Land (10) 
177B1 Saude L (25) 
6 57 129A Chaseburg SICL (17) 
163B Fayette SICL (26) 
163C2 Fayette SICL (22) 
163D2 Fayette SICL (21) 
163E2 Fayette SICL (14) 
7 46 280A Mahaska SICL (12) 
281B1 Otley SICL (35) 
281C2 Otley SICL (21) 
281D2 Otley SICL (32) 
8 56,77 119A Muscatine SICL (16) 
120B1 Tama SICL (26) 
120C2 Tama SICL (32) 
120D2 Tama SICL (17) 
162E2 Downs SIL (9) 
9 55,59,65,78 119A Muscatine SICL (24) 
120B1 Tama SICL (41) 
120C2 Tama SICL (35) 
^Derived from Soil Conservation Service Soil Survey Maps. 
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predominant soil types occurring in the study aggregates and their 
normalized percentages. 
Each of the nine study aggregates was assumed to be composed of 
similar farms of 300 acres each, and a "typical" or "representative" farm 
was constructed for each study aggregate. Consistent with the cropping 
practices in the study area, each representative farm was given the option 
of growing continuous corn, corn-beans, or corn-corn-oats-meadow-meadow 
rotations. The representative farms could choose from a list of tillage 
systems that included fall moldboard plowing, fall chisel plowing, spring 
chisel plowing, spring disking, and no-till planting. For any tillage 
system, the representative farmer could use straight row or contour culti­
vation and could terrace the cropland. Table III-2 lists the cropping 
options for farmers in the river basin. 
The livestock activities assumed available to each representative 
farm included farrow-to-finish swine operations, beef cow-calf operations, 
feeder steer finishing, and dairy enterprises. Livestock operations were 
limited to on-farm produced feed grain and forage. While livestock 
production activities have little direct effect on soil loss, their inclu­
sion in the model is necessary because the forage crop requirements of 
livestock will reduce the number of acres available for row crops and will 
absorb some increases in forage production. 
To determine a baseline solution for crop and livestock production in 
the study area, a linear programming model which maximized net farm income 
was constructed. The objective function of the model was; 
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Table III-2. Rotation, tillage system, and practice options for 
farmers 
Rotations 
1) Continous corn 
2) Corn-beans 
3) Corn-corn-oats-meadow-meadow (CCOMM) 
Tillage systems^ 
1) Moldboard plow in fall 
2) Chisel plow in fall 
3) Chisel plow in spring 
4) Spring disk 
5) No-till planter 
Practices 
1) Straight row (up and down) 
2) Contour 
3) Terrace 
^Listed in order of decreasing erosivity. 
BNI = I I, 
a=l 
(15) 
where BNI Is the total net farm income for the river basin, and is 
the total net farm income in the a-th soil aggregate. As the model is 
constructed, the solution for each soil aggregate is independent of the 
others and the baseline solution is the sum of the solutions obtained from 
the nine models, one for each farm. This means that farmers in one study 
aggregate may adjust production techniques and output levels, but the 
model does not allow resources to be reallocated from one study aggregate 
to another; nor can farmers enter or leave the study area. The model 
allows a determination of the most efficient allocation of resources for a 
farmer; not a determination of the most efficient allocation of resources 
within the Iowa River Basin. 
Net farm income for each study aggregate equals the total net income 
of the farms in that aggregate. To obtain an estimate of net Income for 
each representative farm in study aggregate a, I^ is divided by the 
actual number of farms in the a-th study aggregate. 
Net income is equal to the total receipts from crop and livestock 
sales less all costs except those constituting returns to farmland and 
management. All labor inputs are assumed to be purchased, so net income 
is exclusive of the returns to labor provided by the farm operator. It is 
also assumed that farmers do not hold inventories of inputs or outputs 
from one production year to the next. The net income estimates are for a 
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representative crop year under current technological conditions, given 
expected crop and livestock prices and input costs. 
The objective function that is maximized in the solution of the a-th 
study aggregate is given by: 
'•i "ia 1=1 1=6 
5 
" r t p *artp "'artp * "^1 ^lartp 
%1/l^artpf'' 
1, 9 study aggregates; 
1, 2, 3 rotations; 
1, 5 tillage systems; 
1, 2 ,  3 practices; 
1, 2, 3 fertilizer requirement levels; 
corn sales in bushels of the a-th study aggregate; 
soybean sales in bushels of the a-th study aggregate; 
hay sales in tons of the a-th study aggregate; 
oats sales in bushels of the a-th study aggregate; 
straw sales in tons of the a-th study aggregate; 
number of steers in the a-th study aggregate; 
with a = 
r = 
t = 
P = 
f = 
%la = 
^2a = 
Sa = 
Sa = 
%6a = 
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number of calves in the a-th study aggregate; 
number of dairy cows in the a-th study aggregate; 
number of hog-litters in the a-th study aggregate; 
per bushel price of corn; 
per bushel price of soybeans; 
per ton price of hay; 
per bushel price of oats; 
per ton price of straw; 
sales price per steer; 
sales price per calf; 
milk price per cow; 
sales prir;e per litter; 
cost per steer of steer feeding operations exclusive of feed; 
cost per calf of cow-calf operations exclusive of feed; 
cost per cow of dairy operations exclusive of feed; 
cost per litter of hog operations exclusive of feed; 
acres of rotation r in the a-th study aggregate utilizing the 
t-th tillage system and the p-th practice; 
per acre cost of the r-th rotation in the a-th study aggregate 
utilizing the t-th tillage system and the p-th practice, 
exclusive of chemical and fuel costs and exclusive of returns to 
farmland and management; 
diesel fuel requirements per acre of the r-th rotation in the 
a-th study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th 
practice; 
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^2art ~ propane gas requirements per acre of the r-th rotation in the 
a-th study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th 
practice; 
^Sartp ~ insecticide requirements per acre of the r-th rotation in the 
a-th study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th 
practice; 
Z, = corn herbicide requirements per acre of the r-th rotation in the 
4artp 
a-th study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and the 
p-th practice; 
Z^ = bean herbicide requirements per acre of the r-th rotation in the 
5artp 
a-th study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and the 
p-th practice; 
^6artpf ~ nitrogen purchases per acre of the r-th rotation in the a-th 
study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and i>-th 
practice at the f-th level of nitrogen requirements; 
Zyartpf ~ phosphorus purchases per acre of the r-th rotation in the a-th 
study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and the p-th 
practice at the f-th level of phosphorus requirements ; 
Zgart f ~ potassium purchases per acre of the r-th rotation in the a-th 
study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th 
practice at the f-th level of potassium requirements; 
= price per gallon of diesel fuel; 
Kg = price per gallon of propane; 
Kg = price per acre of insecticide; 
K^ = price per acre of corn herbicide; 
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= price per acre of bean herbicide; 
Kg = price per pound of nitrogen; 
Ky = price per pound of phosphorus; and 
Kg = price per pound of potassium. 
The model requires the farmer to choose—given price vectors for 
crops, livestock, and inputs—the combination of rotations, tillage 
systems, practices, and levels of livestock activities that maximize the 
value of net income. The choice of crop production and livestock activi­
ties is made subject to the following constraints on land and crop output 
levels: 
I Ï I *artp + 
r t p 
(17) 
9 
i ia — 
( 1 8 )  
(19) 
where r = r^ is the index of the CB rotation; 
^ ^  ^ 3ar tp ^ar tp \a 
t p m m 
(20 )  
where r = r^ is the index of the CCOMM rotation 
% % ?5ar tp *at tp - Sa - ®a =8a i 
t p m m 
(21)  
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t p m m 
PP + MTPP - G X_ >0; (23) 
a a a 7a — 
PP - PPTM > 0; (24) 
a a — 
f Ï Ï V tp - ""'•'a > <") 
t p m 
Î Î Î *artp ("artpf ' «artpf ' ^6a' " <"> 
r t p 
with PP^ = acres of permanent pasture in the a-th study aggregate; 
Lg = total available acres in the a-th study aggregate; 
^lartpf ~ corn yield per acre of the r-th rotation in the a-th study 
aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th practice 
at the f-th level of nitrogen requirements; 
Y„ = bean yield per acre of the corn-bean rotation in the a-th study 
2ar^tp 
aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th practice; 
Y„ = oats yield per acre of the CCOMM rotation in the a-th study 
3ar„tp 
aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th practice; 
Y^ar ^ ~ hay yield per acre of the CCOMM rotation in the a-th study 
m 
aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th practice; 
Y 
Sar^tp = straw yield per acre of the CCOMM rotation in the a-th study 
aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th practice; 
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Rg = corn requirement per steer; 
Ry = corn requirement per calf; 
Rg = corn requirement per dairy cow; 
Rg = corn requirement per litter; 
Og = oats requirement per litter; 
Sg = straw requirement per dairy cow; 
Hg = hay requirement per dairy cow; 
Gg = pasture requirement per calf; 
MTPP^ = "change one acre of meadow to one acre of permanent pasture"; 
PPTM^ = "change one acre of permanent pasture to one acre of meadow"; 
^artpf ~ level nitrogen requirements per acre of the r-th rotation 
in the a-th study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system 
and p-th practice; and 
Martpf - nitrogen carryover per acre of the r-th rotation in the a-th 
study aggregate utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th 
practice. 
In addition to the above constraints, bounds of the following form 
were placed on feasible activity levels : 
(27) 
(28)  
%ia - 1 0- 1 - S' 7' 
Xia - 2 0. 1 - 6 
4 
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where t = is the fall moldboard tillage system option; 
= upper bound on the number of steers in study aggregate a 
(Xg^ is a lower bound); 
3^^ = upper bound on the number of calves in study aggregate a (X^^ 
is a lower bound); 
Xg^ = lower bound on the number of dairy cows in study aggregate a; 
= upper bound on the number of hog litters in study aggregate a 
(Xg^ is a lower bound); and 
= lower bound on fall moldboard tillage in study aggregate a in 
number of acres. 
These restrictions are imposed in the baseline solution and, except for 
the last one, in subsequent policy solutions. These constraints serve two 
purposes. In the baseline solution, they force the model's results to be 
representative of existing crop and livestock production activities in the 
study area. In some cases, this requires a lower bound and in others, an 
upper bound. Such bounding is necessitated when the baseline solution 
does not yield representative activity levels because of data imperfec­
tions or objectives not incorporated into the model but affecting the 
behavior of farmers. For example, the unbounded model predicts that 
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fanners in the study area will maintain smaller dairy herds than they 
actually do, and it also indicates that less moldboard plowing will occur 
than in practice. However, some farmers maintain low-return dairy 
operations as a hedge against unexpected downward movements in row crop 
prices. Similarly, some farmers may view moldboard plowing as a less 
risky tillage practice than the alternatives, or they may receive utility 
from having fields that are turned over in the fall. Bounds may partially 
compensate for not incorporating risk-avoidance and aesthetic goals in the 
model's objective function. 
Capacity estimates were also used to limit unrealistically large 
swings in livestock numbers. The high costs associated with rapid 
adjustment of livestock production tend to keep producers in the market 
during unprofitable periods and inhibit others from entering the market 
during profitable periods. Bounds provide a method of taking account of 
the costs that are incurred when farmers rapidly adjust their livestock 
operations. Bounds also help take account of the price adjustment effects 
that would normally occur with large swings in livestock supply. When 
capacity bounds are used, the model generates livestock production levels 
that are comparable to current production and historical trends. 
Crop yield estimates used for each study aggregate were the weighted 
averages of the crop yield estimates of each soil type appearing in the 
soil aggregate. Specific crop yield estimates for each soil type were 
taken from estimates published by Iowa State University (5). 
The basic recommended fertilizer levels for each study aggregate were 
constructed by first finding the recommended fertilizer levels for each 
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soil type within a particular study aggregate, and then taking the 
weighted average of the ferilizer levels for the soil types. Fertilizer 
recommendations for the soil types were derived from two extension 
publications (18 and 19). 
To determine the cost of operating and maintaining a particular 
machinery complement, an enterprise budget generator from the Cooperative 
Extension Service (I.S.U.) was used. This computer routine provides a 
means of delineating machinery complements data, performing the needed 
computations, and producing the fixed and variable costs associated with 
the machinery complements. To allow for a more direct analysis of fuel 
use, the fuel use component of the machinery complements was separated 
from the other costs of the machinery complement. 
Farms in the model purchase diesel fuel to perform field operations, 
and purchase propane gas to dry corn. The diesel fuel requirements were 
developed from data prepared by the Iowa State University Cooperative 
Extension Service (2) which give the gallons per acre of diesel fuel 
required to perform various field operations on a Central Iowa loam soil 
(see Table III-3). A coefficient for each crop production activity in the 
model was constructed by summing the requirements for each field operation 
composing that activity. The coefficients are inflated by five percent 
for crop production activities involving countour tillage in order to 
allow for the extra fuel expenditure involved in handling point rows. 
The propane gas requirements for corn drying were assumed to be 
0.1856 gallons/bushel. This figure was derived from information contained 
in the enterprise budget generator. 
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Table III-3. Fuel requirements for various rotations and tillage systems 
Gallons per acre 
Rotation Light Medium^ Heavy 
Continuous corn, fall moldboard 6.28 7.15 8.40 
Corn-beans, fall moldboard 4.57 5.54 5.95 
Continuous corn, fall chisel 5.96 6.95 7.10 
Corn-beans, fall chisel 5.89 5.69 5.98 
Continuous corn, spring chisel 5.96 6.95 7.10 
Corn-beans, spring disk 4.46 5.04 4.88 
Corn-beans, double chisel, fall 4.61 5.44 6.06 
Corn-meadow, fall moldboard 2.70 3.11 3.65 
Corn-meadow, fall chisel 2.99 3.38 3.79 
Corn-meadow, spring chisel 2.99 3.38 3.79 
Continuous corn, no-till 3.00 3.35 3.61 
Corn-beans, no-till 2.44 2.79 3.05 
^These figures are for a Central Iowa loam soil. The "light" and 
"heavy" column entries represent adjustments to these basic figures to 
reflect changes in fuel consumption. 
139 
A baseline solution of the model will have associated with it a level 
of gross soil erosion of 
- - n i l  * a » p  < 3 0 ,  
where T is total erosion from farmland in the study area and E is the 
artp 
gross soil loss per acre of the r-th rotation in the a-th study aggregate 
utilizing the t-th tillage system and p-th practice. Estimates of soil 
erosion are constructed using the universal soil loss equation that was 
presented earlier.^ 
The values of pKÀo for terraced and unterraced soil types, and the 
value of TT for contouring were obtained for all soil types in the study 
area from data developed by Harmon, Knutson, and Rosenberry (7). The 
cover and management factors for the alternative crop production 
activities on each soil type were also obtained from data specific to Iowa 
(9). On the basis of these data, the gross erosion on each soil type was 
computed for any given crop production activity. 
^Equation (1) defines gross soil loss as follows: 
E = ptcXayir. 
140 
RESULTS 
To determine a baseline solution for the programming model, net farm 
income was maximized for each of the study aggregates (and, thus, for each 
representative farm in the study aggregates) using 1978 average prices for 
inputs and outputs.^ Total net farm income for the river basin (BNI) 
was $324,853,007, with 131,507,758 bushels of corn and 22,161,064 bushels 
of soybeans produced. In the baseline solution, no land was terraced and 
no contour or no-till planting occurred. Associated with the baseline 
production solution was gross erosion in the study area of 16,968,093 tons 
of soil or 8.65 tons/acre. 
Results for Alternative Energy Prices in the 
Absence of Soil Loss Policy 
In order to analyze the effects of higher relative energy prices, the 
costs of machinery, nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, corn herbicide, bean 
herbicide, and insecticide were adjusted in accord with 1985 and 1990 
price projections (while output prices were held constant). Price projec­
tions for energy inputs were obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy 
(14). Energy input quantities used in the production of agricultural 
inputs were taken from data compiled by Pidgeon (15). The coal, natural 
gas, oil, and electricity requirements for the manufacture of fertilizers, 
herbicides, Insecticides, and machinery were entered in the model, and the 
^The following crop and livestock prices were employed in the 
model: corn = $2.50/bu., soybeans = $6.50/bu., hay = $62.76/ton, oats = 
$1.40/bu., straw = $30/ton, steers = $62/hwt., calves = $70/hwt., milk = 
$10.50/hwt., and hogs = $40/hwt. 
costs of the farm inputs were increased as projected energy prices 
increased. Diesel fuel and propane costs were entered directly for each 
time period. 
The overall results obtained by solving the programming model for 
projected 1985 and 1990 energy prices are that higher relative prices for 
energy inputs tend to decrease both soil erosion and the amount of fertil­
izer used by farmers. This reduction occurs in part because conservation 
tillage practices (no-till plantings) are less energy intensive. Also, 
continuous corn production is more energy-intensive and more fertilizer-
using than soybean production. Table III-4 indicates that as energy 
prices rise, farmers are induced to switch away from continuous corn to 
corn-bean rotations, and to reduce fall chiseling and to increase no-till 
planting. 
It is not surprising that these results are different from those of 
Forster and Rask (6). In constructing their model, Forster and Rask 
consider only three different soil types and allow farmers very few 
production alternatives. Farmers are not allowed to raise livestock and 
are constrained to use only the corn-beans rotation. Although farmers may 
choose from among three tillage systems, their baseline results indicate 
that no-till planting is the most profitable method for two of the repre­
sentative farms even at 1976 energy price levels. Therefore, no energy-
saving substitutions are possible on those farms. In addition, the third 
farm is constructed for a soil type that is particularly ill-suited for 
the use of no-till planting (6, p. 3). 
The effect of energy price-induced alterations in rotations and 
tillage practices in the Iowa River Basin is shown in more detail in 
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Table III-4. Acreage in various rotations and tillage systems with 
alternative energy prices (no soil loss policy) 
Cropping activity 1978 1985 1990 
Continuous corn 
Fall chisel 519,797 24,057 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 1,039,595 1,375,313 1,399,368 
No-till 0 147,794 147,794 
Total 1,039,595 1,523,107 1,547,162 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 35,779 58,015 58,015 
Fall chisel 304,471 304,471 304,471 
Total 340,250 362,486 362,486 
Permanent pasture 61,435 51,429 51,429 
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Table III-5. In the absence of soil loss restriction policy, soybean 
production would increase by 9.9 million bushels from 1978 to 1985, and by 
an additional 300,000 bushels between 1985 and 1990. Concomitantly, corn 
production would fall by 40 million bushels from 1978 to 1985, and would 
decrease an additional 3 million bushels betwen 1985 and 1990. The 
decrease in corn production would cause steer finishing to fall by 27,000 
head. 
The introduction of no-till planting in farm operations would cause 
total erosion for the river basin to fall by 3.6 million tons from 1978 to 
1985, and by an additional 100,000 tons by 1990. According to the model, 
higher energy prices alone would by 1990 cause a 22 percent decrease in 
soil erosion in the river basin. 
If energy prices follow their projected trend, then from 1978 to 
1990, nitrogen use would fall by 56 million pounds (a 35 percent drop) 
with decreases in potassium and phosphorus use also occurring in the river 
basin. 
The model predicts, then, that higher energy prices would tend to 
reduce the amount of NFS pollution originating from farm production 
activities. Table III-5 indicates that higher energy prices mean lower 
net income for farmers in the river basin and a decrease in the amount of 
fuel used. 
The sensitivity of the model was tested by running programming solu­
tions for "low" 1985 energy price projections and for 1995 projections. 
The results of the sensitivity tests were as expected. The farm-level 
adjustments for the "low" 1985 projections were intermediate of the 
results for the 1978 energy prices and the regular 1985 projections. 
The solution values for the 1995 price levels were very similar to 
those obtained under 1990 price levels. Since technology is fixed in the 
Table III-5. River basin results for higher energy prices with and without soil loss restrictions 
No restrictions lOT^ restrictions 5T restrictions 3T restrictions 
1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 
Basin net farm income 
($ million) 325 287 262 324 286 261 307 271 247 281 246 224 
Decrease from baseline 
level ($ million) — 38 63 0.6 39 64 18 54 78 44 79 101 
Total erosion (million 
tons) 17.0 13.4 13.3 13.1 12.7 12.6 7.75 7.73 7.67 5.44 5.43 5.39 
Average erosion (tons/ 
acre) 8.65 6.83 6.79 6.70 6.47 6.40 3.95 3.94 3.91 2.77 2.77 2.75 
Corn (million bu.) 132 92 89 131 92 89 119 92 82 110 79 74 
Soybeans (million bu.) 22.2 32.1 32.4 21.7 31.4 31.8 21.2 27.5 29.5 19.8 26.6 27.5 
Cows (1000 hd.) 122 122 122 122 122 122 154 155 154 157 157 157 
Steers (1000 hd.) 88 61 61 88 61 61 88 61 61 88 61 61 
Nitrogen (million lbs.) 160 106 104 157 105 102 149 106 94 143 95 89 
Phosphorus (million lbs.) 106.7 104.6 104.5 106.5 104.4 104.3 105.3 103.1 103.0 103.9 101.6 101.5 
Potassium (milion lbs.) 60.8 56.5 56.4 60.7 56.4 56.3 58.9 56.2 55.4 57.9 54.5 54.1 
Diesel (million gal.) 12.8 11.0 10.6 12.6 11.1 10.7 11.7 10.8 9.9 11.2 10.5 8.9 
Propane (million gal.) 24.1 12.0 11.9 24.0 12.0 11.9 22.6 11.7 11.1 20.7 10.5 10.2 
Contour (1000 acres) 0 0 0 322 105 106 164 114 140 177 259 270 
No-till (1000 acres) 0 148 148 21 112 111 208 235 327 461 466 540 
Terraced (1000 acres) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 102 32 20 
^lOT indicates that the policy option considered restricted soil loss to an average of 10 
tons per acre per farm. 
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model, there are limited possibilities for energy-saving substitutions in 
farm production activities. As relative prices for energy rise, 
energy-saving substitutions are quickly exhausted. The sensitivity test 
shows that total erosion for the river basin falls less than one percent 
when 1995 energy prices replace 1990 prices. 
In solutions where alternative control strategies are implemented, 
the model is modified by imposing additional restrictions on the selection 
of activities. Two alternative control strategies were considered—soil 
loss restrictions and soil loss reduction subsidies. 
The soil loss restriction strategy imposed ten, five and three ton 
restrictions on the average per acre erosion on each farm. That is, each 
farm is allowed only those activities that result in an average per acre 
soil loss that is less than or equal to a specified level. After imposing 
each soil loss restriction, energy prices were increased to show how a 
particular control level interacted with higher energy prices. 
The erosion-reduction subsidy strategy allows, in turn, for payments 
to farms of $1, $6, $10, and $14 for each ton of soil abated from the 
baseline level.^ Each farm is allowed to alter rotations, tillage 
systems, cropping practices, and livestock activities in a manner that 
maximizes net farm income—given that the farm will receive $X/ton for 
reduction in soil erosion from the baseline level. After generating each 
subsidy level, energy prices were increased to show how a particular 
subsidy level interacted with higher energy prices. 
^Subsidy levels of $1, $2 $20 were analyzed. The $1, $6, 
$10, and $14 levels are presented as representative. 
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Results for Soil Loss Restrictions with 
Baseline Energy Prices 
The results of imposing various soil loss restrictions on farmers 
with energy prices at their baseline levels are shown in Table III-6. The 
primary ways that farmers meet the restrictions are by switching to 
contouring, no-till planting, and terracing; by transferring some fall 
plowing to the spring; and by removing land from continuous corn and corn-
bean rotations to permanent pasture and CCOMM. The ratio of land in 
continuous corn to land in corn-beans rotations remains relatively 
constant at each level of restriction. 
Table III-5 indicates that the imposition of a 10 tons/acre erosion 
limit on each farm would reduce erosion in the river basin by 1.95 
tons/acre, or 23 percent. The 5 tons/acre restriction would reduce 
erosion in the study area by 54 percent. This compares with the 45 
percent decrease in erosion that Taylor and Frohberg found would occur if 
a 5 tons/acre restriction was imposed throughout the Corn Belt (20, 
p. 31). 
The 10 tons/acre soil loss restriction would cause net income in the 
river basin to fall by $600,000. More restrictive soil loss limits cause 
much larger decreases in net farm income. 
Since soil loss restrictions induce an increase in the total number 
of acres planted in permanent pasture and CCOMM rotations (Table III-6) , 
more hay will be produced. With more hay available, farmers will increase 
the number of cows in their herds (Table III-5). On the other hand, the 
removal of land from continuous corn planting will cause a slight decrease 
in total fertilizer used. 
Table 1II-6. Acres in various rotations and tillage systems with baseline (1978) energy prices 
and alternative levels of soil loss restrictions 
Cropping activity No restrictions 10 ton limit 5 ton limit 3 ton limit 
Continuous corn 
Fall chisel 
Fall chisel (Cf) 
Fall chisel (T^) 
Spring chisel (C) 
Spring chisel (T) 
No-till 
Total 
519,797 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
519,797 
493,031 
8,449 
0 
0 
0 
6,888 
508,368 
375,462 
15,743 
0 
23,276 
0 
69,455 
483,936 
291,097 
0 
10,760 
5,539 
23,121 
153,820 
484,337 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 
Fall chisel (C) 
Spring disk (C) 
Spring disk (T) 
No-till 
Total 
1,039,595 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,039,595 
986,065 
16,899 
0 
0 
13,777 
1,016,741 
750,926 
47,059 
78,039 
0 
138,912 
1,014,936 
582,195 
0 
11,078 
67,762 
307,644 
968,679 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 
Fall chisel 
Fall chisel (C) 
Fall chisel (T) 
Spring chisel 
Spring chisel (C) 
Total 
Permanent pasture 
35,779 
304,471 
0 
0 
0 
0 
340,250 
61,435 
35,779 
62,308 
296,434 
0 
0 
0 
394,521 
41,430 
35,779 
7,718 
0 
0 
232,169 
0 
275,666 
186,524 
35,779 
0 
7,582 
136 
0 
152,930 
196,427 
311,618 
^C indicates contouring. 
T indicates terracing. 
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Table III-5 shows that contouring is used extensively to meet the ten 
ton limit, and that no-till planting increases dramatically when more 
restrictive limits are imposed. These results are generally consistent 
with the results of the Alt and Heady study (1, p. 35). Table III-5 also 
indicates that only when a 3 tons/acre limit is in effect do farmers 
resort to terracing. 
Results for Soil Loss Restrictions with 
Alternative Energy Prices 
At any given level of soil loss restriction, higher relative prices 
for energy make the soil loss limit policy more restrictive relative to 
soil erosion and fertilizer use. Tables III-7 to III-9 give a detailed 
account of how higher energy prices interact with each soil loss limit to 
induce changes in rotations, tillage systems, and practices. It is 
apparent that for any level of restriction, higher energy prices cause a 
decrease in the number of acres planted in continuous corn and an increase 
in the number of acres planted by the no-till method. 
The switch to no-till planting and the increase in the number of 
acres in permanent pasture and CCOMM rotations that is induced by higher 
relative prices for energy bring about a reduction in soil erosion. 
Table III-5 shows that for any given soil loss restriction, higher energy 
prices cause a reduction in soil erosion beyond that level which is 
obtained when energy prices are constant. With a ten ton soil loss limit 
in place, total erosion in the river basin would be 13.1 million tons per 
year. If energy prices follow their projected course, then total erosion 
would fall to 12.6 million tons by 1990 (a 3.8 percent decrease). The 
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Table III-7. Acres in various rotations and tillage systems with a ten 
ton limit and alternative energy prices 
1978 10 ton 1985 10 ton 1990 10 ton 
Cropping activity limit limit limit 
Continuous corn 
Fall chisel 493,031 24,057 0 
Fall chisel (C*) 8,449 0 0 
No-till 6,888 2,781 0 
Total 508,368 26,838 0 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 986,065 1,568,408 1,399,366 
Fall chisel (C) 16,899 0 0 
No-till 13,777 109,417 111,098 
Total 1,016,741 1,677,825 1,510,464 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 35,779 58,015 58,015 
Fall chisel 62,308 62,308 255,407 
Fall chisel (C) 296,434 104,658 105,759 
Total 394,521 224,981 419,181 
Permanent pasture 41,430 31,424 31,424 
^C Indicates contouring. 
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Table III-8. Acres in various rotations and tillage systems with a 
five ton limit and alternative energy prices 
1978 5 ton 1985 5 ton 1990 5 ton 
Cropping activity limit limit limit 
Continuous corn 
Fall chisel 375,462 83,673 0 
Fall chisel (Cf) 15,743 0 0 
Spring chisel (C) 23,276 23,276 0 
No-till 69,455 0 0 
Total 483,936 106,949 0 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 750,926 1,004,004 995,040 
Fall chisel (C) 47,059 0 0 
Spring disk (C) 78,039 91,222 109,384 
No-till 138,912 234,854 327,492 
Total 1,014,936 1,330,080 1,431,916 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 35,779 58,015 58,015 
Fall chisel 7,718 7,718 13,788 
Fall chisel (C) 0 0 30,170 
Spring chisel 232,169 316,693 293,780 
Total 275,666 382,426 395,753 
Permanent pasture 186,524 141,613 133,399 
®C indicates contouring. 
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Table III-9. Acres in various rotations and tillage systems with a 
three ton limit and alternative energy prices 
Cropping activity 
1978 3 ton 
limit 
1985 3 ton 
limit 
1990 3 ton 
limit 
Continuous corn 
Fall chisel 291,097 
Fall chisel (T^) 10,760 
Spring chisel (C ) 5,539 
Spring chisel (T) 23,121 
No-till 153,820 
Total 484,337 
48,809 
0 
4,275 
0 
6,213 
59,297 
0 
0 
4,275 
0 
0 
4,275 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 
Spring disk (C) 
Spring disk. (T) 
No-till 
Total 
582,195 
11,078 
67,762 
307,644 
968,679 
807,508 
8,551 
32,281 
460,000 
1,308,340 
782,061 
21,031 
19,800 
540,472 
1,363,364 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 
Fall chisel 
Fall chisel (C) 
Fall chisel (T) 
Spring chisel (C) 
Total 
Permanent pasture 
35,779 
0 
7,582 
136 
152,930 
196,427 
311,618 
58,015 
0 
7,582 
136 
238,214 
303,947 
289,482 
58,015 
1,149 
6,569 
0 
238,214 
303,947 
289,482 
®T indicates terracing. 
C Indicates contouring. 
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same energy price trend would induce a one percent decrease in soil 
erosion if a five ton soil loss restriction was in place during the 
period, or a .9 percent decrease in erosion if a three ton soil loss 
restriction was in effect during the period. 
Table III-10 shows the impact of rising energy prices on soil erosion 
in eaçh of the study aggregates with and without soil loss restriction 
policy in effect. It is clear that in the absence of soil loss restric­
tions, rising energy prices bring about the greatest decreases in soil 
erosion in those study aggregates that have the most erosive soil. For 
instance, soil erosion in study aggregate 6 is cut by 37 percent when 
energy prices increase from 1978 levels to projected 1985 levels. A 
similar increase in energy prices would cause a 27 percent decrease in 
erosion in study aggregate 7, and a 24 percent decrease in erosion in 
study aggregate 8 in the absence of any soil loss policy. The price-
induced switch to no-till planting in the most erosive study aggregates 
brings about a dramatic decrease in soil erosion. 
With soil loss restrictions in place, higher energy prices bring 
about decreases in soil erosion primarily in the less erosive study 
aggregates. This is evident from an examination of Table III-IO. A 5 
tons/acre soil loss limit, for instance, constrains agricultural produc­
tion only in study aggregates 6-9. As energy prices rise to projected 
1985 levels, soil erosion in these four study aggregates remains at the 
five ton limit. Erosion in study aggregates 2 and 4 is unaffected when 
energy prices rise to the 1985 projected levels. Erosion in study 
Table III-IO. Study aggregate erosion (in 1000s of tons and tons/acre) with and without soil 
loss restrictions 
Study No restrictions 10 tons/farm ave. 5 tons/farm ave. 3 tons/farm ave. 
aggregate 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 
1 90 , 
(1.4) 
h 87 
^ (1.4) 
87 
(1.4) 
*a * * * * * * * * 
2 1,458 
(2.9) 
1,458 
(2.9) 
1,424 
(2.8) 
* * * * * * * * * 
3 195 
(4.1) 
176 
(3.7) 
161 
(3.4) 
* * * * * * 142 
(3.0) 
R^ R 
4 230 
(2.9) 
230 
(2.9) 
224 
(2.8) 
* * * * * * * * * 
5 208 
(1.3) 
204 
(1.2) 
204 
(1.2) 
* * * * * * * * * 
6 3,723 
(21.7) 
2,355 
(13.7) 
2,355 
(13.7) 
1,716 
(10.0) 
R R 858 
(5.0) 
R R 515 
(3.0) 
R R 
7 2,296 
(11.6) 
1,681 
(8.5) 
1,681 
(8.5) 
1,977 
(10.0) 
* * 988 
(5.0) 
R R 593 
(3.0) 
R R 
8 5,989 
(13.3) 
4,557 
(10.1) 
4,557 
(10.1) 
4,491 
(10.0) 
R R 2,296 
(5.0) 
R R 1,347 
(3.0) 
R R 
9 2,780 
(9.7) 
2,650 
(9.3) 
2,626 
(9.2) 
* * * 1,429 
(5.0) 
R R 857 
(3.0) 
R R 
indicates that the study aggregate erosion equals the "no restrictions" value. 
^Terms in parentheses are tons/acre. 
indicates that the study aggregate erosion equals the given restricted value. 
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aggregates 1, 3, and 5 falls by 3,000 tons, 19,000 tons, and 4,000 tons, 
respectively, when energy prices rise from 1978 to projected 1985 levels. 
An explanation of the above results can be found in the use of no-
till planting methods. Soil loss restrictions necessitate the use of no-
till planting in study aggregates that are constrained by the erosion 
limits. Since no-till planting is also energy-efficient, rising energy 
prices will induce a switch to no-till methods in some of those study 
aggregates that are not using no-till. However, the study aggregates that 
are constrained by the soil loss limits are already using no-till—the 
most energy-efficient method. Therefore, in those study aggregates 
constrained by the erosion limits, rising energy prices do not induce 
alterations in cropping practices that result in decreases in erosion 
below the policy limit. Of course, no price-induced set of alterations 
can occur that would raise soil erosion above the restricted level. 
Terracing of farmland is very energy-intensive. If energy prices are 
at their 1978 levels, then a three ton soil loss restriction would be met, 
in part, by terracing 102,000 acres. Rising energy prices would reduce 
the number of acres terraced 69 percent by 1985 and 80 percent by 1990 
(Table III-5). 
Since rising energy prices work to decrease continuous corn planting, 
and since com production requires more fertilizer than soybean produc­
tion, higher energy prices induce a decrease in fertilizer use at any 
given level of soil loss restriction. Table III-5 shows that with a 10 
tons/acre soil loss limit in effect, an increase in energy prices from 
1978 levels to projected 1990 levels would cause a 35 percent decrease in 
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nitrogen use. If the same energy price increase occurred with a five ton 
(or three ton) erosion limit in effect, then nitrogen use would fall by 
37 percent (or 38 percent). 
Table III-5 indicates that an increase in energy prices would exacer­
bate the decrease in net income associated with any given level of soil 
loss restriction. A three ton soil loss limit would cause a $44 million 
decrease in net farm income in the river basin if energy prices were at 
their 1978 levels. A three ton soil loss limit combined with projected 
1990 energy prices would cause a $101 million decrease in net income from 
the baseline level. 
In order to understand better the ramifications of soil loss restric­
tion policies, it is necessary to examine their effects on the net income 
of representative farms in the river basin. Table III-ll gives per farm 
net income in each study aggregate, as well as the decrease in net income 
for the representative farms caused by rising energy prices and the 
imposition of erosion limits. 
In the absence of soil loss restrictions, higher energy prices by 
1985 will cause a decrease in per farm net income that ranges from 9.4 
percent (in study aggregate 8) to 14.1 percent (in study aggregate 2) with 
a mean decrease of 12.4 percent. If energy prices follow their projected 
course, then by 1990 per farm net income will have decreased between 15.6 
percent (in study aggregate 8) and 23.5 percent (in study aggregate 2) 
with a mean decrease from the baseline level of 20.5 percent. 
Table III-ll indicates that with energy prices at their baseline 
levels, a 10 tons/acre soil loss limit causes a small decrease in net 
Table III-ll. Baseline per farm net income and decreases from baseline in per farm net income 
Study Per 
aggre- farm No restrictions 10 tons/farm ave. 5 tons/farm ave. 3 tons/farm ave. 
gate income 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 
1 $43,838 $5,996* $10,135 *b * * * * A * * * 
2 46,780 6,618 11,006 * * * * * * * * * 
3 44,521 6,190 10,203 * * * * * * 55 6,228 10,214 
4 50,936 7,068 11,557 * * * * * * * * * 
5 40,826 5,564 9,154 * * * * * * * * * 
6 43,142 5,096 8,531 838 5,815 9,163 8,668 12,714 15,380 13,636 17,630 20,187 
7 48,537 5,178 8,707 25 * * 4,706 10,209 13,645 9,716 14,881 18,099 
8 52,393 4,905 8,153 57 4,907 8,155 5,434 9,558 12,261 13,605 17,649 20,156 
9 62,290 6,369 10,471 * * * 1,736 8,154 12,218 9,987 15,065 18,247 
^Dollar amounts are the per farm decreases in net income from the baseline solution. 
indicates that the per farm decrease in net income from the baseline solution equals the 
"no restrictions" value. 
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income on farms in three of the study aggregates. The net income of 
farmers in the other study aggregates is not altered by the imposition of 
the 10 ton soil loss limit since erosion on these farms is less in the 
baseline solution than 10 tons/acre (see Table III-10). 
The per farm cost of meeting tighter restrictions is considerably 
higher for farmers in study aggregates 6-9. The decrease in net income 
involved in meeting the five ton limit at 1978 prices ranges from 
$1,736 per farm in aggregate 9 to $8,668 per farm in aggregate 6. At the 
three ton limit with 1978 energy prices, a representative farm in study 
aggregate 6 may suffer a decrease in net income as high as $13,636 (a 32 
percent decrease), and at this level of restriction farmers in five of the 
nine study aggregates will experience some decrease in net income. These 
results support the conclusion drawn from the McGrann and Meyer study that 
there would be significant inequities in applying a uniform soil loss 
restriction (13, p. 8). Some farms are not affected by even the 3 
tons/acre restriction while others would suffer substantial decreases in 
net income. 
The decrease in per farm net income is much greater, of course, in 
the presence of soil loss restriction policies and higher energy prices. 
If projected 1990 energy prices prevail, then a three ton soil loss 
restriction may cause a decrease in study aggregate 6 of up to $20,187 in 
per farm net income (a 47 percent decrease). 
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Results for Soil Loss Abatement Subsidies 
with Baseline Energy Prices 
Table III-12 shows the number of acres in various rotations and 
tillage systems for alternative soil erosion reduction subsidies when 
energy prices are at their baseline levels. As with soil loss 
restrictions, soil erosion abatement subsidies bring about a reduction in 
soil erosion primarily by inducing a switch to no-till planting and an 
increase in permanent pasture. At low subsidy levels, an increase in the 
use of contour planting and a switch of some fall planting to the spring 
play important roles in reducing soil erosion. Terracing does not become 
an economically viable method of erosion control for farmers in the river 
basin until a $10/ton abatement subsidy is offered. 
Table III-13 indicates that as more land is taken out of crop 
production and put into permanent pasture, corn production and soybean 
production (except for the $6 subsidy level) decrease. Fertilizer and 
fuel use levels fall as a result of the decrease in crop production. The 
increase in hay production that occurs because of the increase in 
permanent pasture eventually causes an increase in the number of cows in 
the river basin. 
A $l/ton soil loss abatement subsidy would reduce soil erosion by 
3.09 tons/acre to a 5.56 tons/acre average for the river basin. Table 
III-13 shows that the total cost of the $l/ton subsidy would be $6.1 
million. To get soil erosion in the river basin down to a three tons/acre 
average, a $10/ton abatement subsidy would be necessary. The cost of the 
$10/ton subsidy would exceed $100 million. 
Table III-12. Acres In various rotations and tillage systems with baseline energy prices and 
alternative levels of soil loss abatement subsidies 
Cropping activity $l/ton subsidy $6/ton subsidy $10/ton subsidy $14/ton subsidy 
Continuous com 
Fall chisel 440,332 
Fall chisel (C^) 42,103 
Fall chisel (T^) 0 
Spring chisel (C) 0 
No-till 33,284 
Total 515,718 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 880,666 
Fall chisel (C) 84,208 
Spring disk (C) 0 
Spring disk (T) 0 
No-till 66,568 
Total 1,031,439 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 58,015 
Fall chisel 33,098 
Fall chisel (C) 271,372 
Fall chisel (T) 0 
Spring chisel (C) 0 
Total 362,484 
Permanent pasture 51,429 
440,332 239,245 83,496 
41,056 0 0 
0 10,760 10,760 
0 23,277 23,277 
0 201,086 356,835 
481,388 474,368 474,368 
880,666 478,493 166,994 
141,569 47,059 0 
31,961 46,553 46,553 
0 21,521 21,521 
0 402,172 713,671 
1,054,196 995,798 948,739 
58,015 58,015 58,015 
33,098 0 0 
33,892 0 0 
0 136 136 
200,959 171,431 30,500 
325,964 229,582 88,651 
99,528 261,327 449,316 
®C indicates contouring. 
T indicates terracing. 
Table 111-13. River basin results under abatement subsidy programs and rising energy prices 
$l/ton^  $6/ton $10/ton $14/ton 
1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 
Net farm income w/ subsidy 
($ million) 330.5 292.5 281.8 366.1 329.4 319.5 404.0 372.0 362.7 451.8 420.4 411.1 
Net farm income less subsidy 324.4 286.4 275.7 319.3 277.4 267.4 293.0 254.7 245.9 259.7 229.5 220.6 
Cost of subsidy ($ million) 6.1 6.1 6.1 46.8 52.0 52.1 111.0 117.3 116.8 192.1 190.9 190.5 
Tnfal pmRirm (nrtlUnn fT>ns) 10.9 10.8 10.8 9.2 8.3 8.2 5.9 5.2 5.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Average erosion (tons/acre) 5.56 5.55 5.55 4.67 4.24 4.22 2.99 2.67 2.69 1.65 1.70 1.72 
Com (fflUlicHi bu.) 131 92 90 125 92 84 111 83 76 98 75 69 
Soybeans (million bu.) 21.9 31.4 31.9 22.2 27.2 29.1 20.2 25.2 27.1 18.5 25.0 26.5 
Gofws (1000 M.) 122 122 122 129 138 138 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Steers (1000 hd.) 88 61 61 88 61 61 88 61 61 88 61 61 
Nitrogen (nrilHon lbs.) 159 105 102 154 102 93 141 100 89 134 100 92 
Hiosphorus (raLLUm lbs.) 106.7 104.5 104.4 106.3 103.9 103.9 104.3 102.6 102.1 103.4 101.7 101.2 
Batassium (million lbs.) 60.9 56.5 56.4 59.8 57.1 56.3 58.0 54.9 54.5 56.6 53.2 53.0 
Hesel (million gal.) 12.3 10.8 10.7 12.0 9.2 9.0 10.1 8.1 8.0 9.1 8.8 8.7 
Propane (million gal.) 24.1 12.1 12.0 24.1 11.9 11.4 21.4 10.8 10.4 18.7 9.8 9.5 
Cbntour (1000 acres) 398 400 400 449 503 503 238 327 327 100 100 100 
ND-till (1000 acres) 100 118 118 0 638 638 603 1105 1105 1071 1105 1105 
"Barraced (1000 acres) 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 32 32 32 32 32 
%nnanent pasture 
(1000 acres) 51 31 31 100 46 46 261 222 222 449 448 448 
*$l/ton indicates 
level. 
that a subsidy of $1 is paid for each ton of erosion abated from the baseline 
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Results for Soil Loss Abatement Subsidies 
with Alternative Energy Prices 
Higher energy prices have the same qualitative effects on farm 
production when a soil erosion abatement subsidy policy is in place as 
they do when a soil loss restriction policy is in effect. Table III-13 
shows that for any subsidy level, higher energy prices tend to reduce 
fertilizer and fuel use, decrease corn and steer production, and increase 
soybean production. 
With a particular soil loss restriction imposed, higher energy prices 
unambiguously reduce the level of erosion in the river basin. The impact 
of higher energy prices on erosion with a subsidy program in effect 
depends on the level of abatement subsidy offered. At low subsidy levels, 
higher energy prices tend to bring about a decrease in erosion. For 
instance, if a $6/ton abatement subsidy is offered, then as energy prices 
rise from their baseline levels to projected 1990 levels, erosion in the 
river basin will fall from 4.67 tons/acre to 4.22 tons/acre. The decrease 
in erosion occurs primarily because higher energy prices induce a switch 
to no-till planting from conventional tillage systems. If a $14/ton 
abatement subsidy is offered, then as energy prices rise to their 1990 
projected levels, erosion in the river basin will increase from 1.65 
tons/acre to 1.72 tons/acre. 
Table III-14 provides insight into why at high subsidy levels rising 
energy prices may induce an increase in soil erosion in the river basin. 
It is clear from the table that a $14/ton erosion abatement subsidy would 
bring about extensive use of no-till planting methods at the baseline 
level of energy prices. When a $14/ton abatement policy is in effect, the 
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Table III-14. Acreage in various rotations and tillage systems with a 
$l4/ton abatement subsidy and alternative energy price 
levels 
Cropping activity 1978 1985 1990 
Continuous corn 
Fall chisel 83,496 51,430 0 
Fall chisel (T®) 10,760 10,760 0 
Spring chisel (C°) 23,277 23,277 23,277 
No-till 356,835 55,023 30,966 
Total 474,368 140,490 54,243 
Corn-beans 
Fall chisel 166,994 163,374 214,804 
Spring disk (C) 46,553 46,553 46,553 
Spring disk (T) 21,521 21,521 32,281 
No-till 713,671 1,050,142 1,074,199 
Total 948,739 1,281,590 1,367,837 
CCOMM 
Fall moldboard 58,015 59,730 59,730 
Fall chisel (T) 136 136 136 
Spring chisel (C) 30,500 30,500 30,500 
Total 88,651 90,366 90,366 
Permanent pasture 449,316 448,631 448,630 
®T Indicates terracing. 
C indicates contouring. 
main impact of rising energy prices is to induce a switch from no-till 
continuous corn to no-till corn-beans rotations. Since no-till corn-beans 
rotations are slightly more erosive than no-till continuous corn, the 
price-induced switch to no-till corn-beans rotations will cause erosion in 
the river basin to rise. If a soil loss restriction policy was in place, 
then the switch from no-till continuous corn to no-till corn-beans would 
have to be offset by an increase in permanent pasture or CCCWM rotations 
of a magnitude sufficient to keep erosion at the restricted level. 
However, farmers are not constrained by the subsidy policy to keep erosion 
below a particular value. At high subsidy levels, farmers react to higher 
energy prices by switching from no-till continuous corn to no-till corn-
beans without making significant adjustments in the number of acres in 
permanent pasture or CCCMM rotations. To maximize net income, farmers 
tend to produce in a more erosive manner when energy prices rise and 
subsidies are high. 
The cost of any subsidy program depends on the level of the soil 
erosion abatement subsidy and on the level of prevailing energy prices. 
Table III-13 shows that a $14/ton subsidy will cost $192.1 million if 1978 
energy prices prevail, and $190.9 million if 1985 projected energy prices 
prevail. The subsidy program will cost less, of course, if rising energy 
prices induce farmers to use more erosive cropping practices. 
Table III-15 shows the subsidy receipts of representative farms in 
the various study aggregates at alternative subsidy and energy price 
levels. The table indicates a large difference in amounts of subsidy 
income that would be received by farmers in the river basin. At the 
Table III-15. Per farm subsidy at alternative subsidy and energy price levels 
Study 
aggre- $l/ton subsidy $6/ton subsidy $10/ton subsidy $14/ton subsidy 
gate 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 1978 1985 1990 
1 0 $12 $12 $245 $72 $72 $408 $102 $120 $571 $207 $207 
2 8 20 23 524 2,452 2,452 4,454 4,087 4,087 6,236 5,722 5,722 
3 356 315 352 2,859 4,024 4,251 4,251 9,939 9,939 12,153 14,507 14,507 
4 0 51 25 478 2,454 2,454 4,455 4,455 4,090 6,238 6,238 5,725 
5 0 6 6 137 42 42 350 350 72 490 490 100 
6 2 ,967 3 ,290 3,290 25,771 27,050 27,050 62,522 62,313 62,313 87,530 87,238 87,238 
7 1 ,149 933 933 8,120 7,778 7,778 25,600 27,116 26,834 38,076 38,076 37,961 
8 1 ,652 1 ,645 1,645 12,122 12,512 12,512 23,223 25,080 25,080 52,994 52,818 52,818 
9 1 ,112 1 ,078 1,078 7,334 7,546 7,732 14,079 17,266 17,266 24,445 24,172 24,172 
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$l/ton subsidy level with 1978 prices, farmers in three study aggregates 
will receive no subsidy payments; while subsidy income ranges from $490 to 
$87,530 per farm at the $14/ton level with 1978 energy prices. The 
highest subsidy payments are associated with erosion abatement on the most 
erosive soils. In particular, subsidy payments of $2,967, $25,771, 
$62,522, and $87,530 per farm in study aggregate 6 are associated with 
subsidy levels of $l/ton, $6/ton, $10/ton, and $14/ton, respectively, at 
constant 1978 energy prices. With a baseline per farm net income of 
$43,142 in study aggregate 6, the subsidy payments correspond to 7%, 60%, 
145%, and 203% of baseline per farm net income. The impact of higher 
energy prices on per farm subsidy receipts varies according to whether 
higher energy prices induce a switch to more erosive, or less erosive, 
cropping practices. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The incremental cost of abatement of soil erosion under the soil loss 
restriction policy at 1978 and projected 1985 energy prices is shown by 
Figure III-l. Figure III-2 gives the marginal cost of abatement curves 
for the subsidy program at 1978 and projected 1985 energy prices. In the 
absence of any soil loss policy, rising energy prices bring about a 
reduction in soil erosion in the river basin by inducing the adoption of 
cropping practices that are less energy-intensive, and that also happen to 
be less erosive. Therefore, the incremental and marginal cost of 
abatement curves for projected 1985 energy prices will lie above their 
respective abatement curves for 1978 energy prices. The incremental (and 
marginal) cost of reducing soil erosion by a specified amount will be 
higher if projected 1985 energy prices prevail. If a marginal benefits of 
abatement curve was known and depicted in either figure, it would be clear 
that higher energy prices cause the socially desirable level of NFS 
pollution abatement to decrease (as long as the marginal benefits of 
abatement curve is not completely inelastic). 
The overall policy implications of the study are that higher energy 
prices will enhance the effectiveness of soil loss restriction policies— 
bringing about a larger reduction in soil erosion and fertilizer use; but 
as the relative price of energy rises, the cost of abating an additional 
unit of soil erosion will rise. Unfortunately, higher energy prices will 
cause an even greater decrease in net farm income to be associated with a 
specific erosion limit than if energy prices were constant. The 
Decrease in basin net income 
(in millions of dollars) ICA 1985 ICA 1978 
40 
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Soil erosion abatement (tons/acre) 
Figure III-l. Incremental cost of abatement for soil loss restriction policy for Iowa River Basin 
^he ICA 1985 curve gives the incremental cost of abatement curve at projected 1985 energy 
prices (an ICA 1990 curve would be virtually identical to the ICA 1985 curve), 
^The ICA 1978 curve gives the incremental cost of abatement curve at 1978 energy prices. 
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Figure III-2. Marginal cost of abatement for subsidy policy for Iowa River Basin 
^An MCA 1990 curve would be almost identical to the MCA 1985 curve. 
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combination of higher energy prices and very restrictive soil loss limits 
may put a severe strain on the net incomes of those farmers with very 
erosive soil. 
Subsidies for erosion abatement will also reduce soil loss and 
fertilizer use, but the impact of higher energy prices on the effective­
ness of the policy is not unambiguous. At low subsidy levels, it seems 
clear that higher energy prices will enhance the effectiveness of the 
subsidy policy in the river basin. However, if subsidy levels are high, 
then rising energy prices may weaken the impact of abatement subsidy 
policy on soil erosion. 
It is important to note that terracing does not play a very large 
role in erosion control under either policy when energy prices are allowed 
to follow their projected course. With an abatement subsidy policy in 
effect, terracing is not economically viable until the subsidies reach the 
$10/ton level, and the number of acres terraced does not increase when a 
$14/ton subsidy is offered. A three ton soil loss restriction will force 
the adoption of terraces, but higher energy prices greatly reduce the 
number of acres terraced. 
In the absence of any soil loss constraints, higher relative prices 
for energy will causé a reduction in soil erosion. The model predicts 
that erosion in the study area will decrease by almost two tons per acre 
over the next seven years if relative prices for energy follow their pro­
jected course. The effect of higher energy prices on soil erosion by 1990 
will be essentially the same as the imposition of a ten tons per acre 
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average soil loss limit on each farm In the river basin with energy prices 
constant. 
There are clear limitations on the extent to which rising energy 
prices can Induce a reduction in soil erosion, given current farm tech­
nology. To reduce soil loss beyond the level associated with higher 
energy prices, an erosion control policy is necessary. However, as soil 
loss limits are made more restrictive (or higher abatement subsidies are 
offered) an increasing amount of cropland will be put into permanent 
pasture, and farm net income will fall (or subsidy payments will 
increase). 
This study attempted to identify important farm inputs whose relative 
prices are likely to change over the course of the next seven years. By 
focusing on energy inputs. Insight was provided as to the Impact of rising 
energy prices on farm production, and on the need to coordinate soil 
erosion policies with changes in energy prices. If energy prices do not 
Increase as fast as projected, then the changes suggested above in 
cropping practices and soil erosion will not occur as soon as indicated. 
Only two soil erosion control policies were considered in this 
analysis. A logical extension of this study would be to consider alterna­
tive policies such as user charges (per ton tax on soil erosion), 
practice-specific subsidies (subsidies provided for terracing or contour 
farming), practice-specific restrictions (no fall moldboard plowing), sale 
of pollution rights, or some combination of policies. It also would prove 
useful to consider the administrative and enforcement costs associated 
with alternative policies for this river basin. 
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Another useful extension would be to add a demand side to the model 
in order to examine the partial equilibrium characteristics of alternative 
policies and energy prices. The model developed above is a legitimate 
tool to use in analyzing the Impacts of an erosion control policy if it is 
applied in only one region. Since the primary responsibility for con­
trolling NFS pollution rests with state governments (20, p. 25), this 
model may provide helpful information to state-level policymakers. A 
national policy that significantly altered cropping practices would bring 
about changes in the prices of most farm inputs and outputs. 
The suggestion that erosion control policy must be formulated with a 
recognition of possible changes that may occur in input and output prices, 
leads one to conclude that another useful extension of this model would be 
to make it fully dynamic. In a first-best world, a researcher would have 
accurate information about future price trends of all inputs and outputs, 
and would have sufficient resources to develop a model that allowed 
farmers a realistic set of production alternatives. Lacking the necessary 
Information and resources, the model used in this analysis provides a 
reasonable second-best alternative. 
Finally, to say that soil loss restrictions or abatement subsidies 
reduce soil erosion by a particular amount is not the same as saying these 
policies will improve water quality by that amount. Two further lines of 
research must be pursued. A transport model must be developed to show how 
particular quantities of soil enter the waterways and what their impact is 
on water quality. The transport model must then be integrated with the 
farm production model in this study. 
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the study presented In the first section of this 
dissertation was to determine the effect of monetary variability on an 
exchange rate. To that end, ordinary least squares techniques were used 
to estimate an exchange rate determination equation for the U.S. dollar/ 
Canadian dollar exchange rate. The estimated equation was of a form 
typical of exchange rate equations derived from monetary theory models, 
but it was augmented by the inclusion of proxies for expected monetary 
variability for the United States and Canada. When the exchange rate 
equation was estimated for alternative specifications of expected monetary 
variability, the results gave strong support to the view that an increase 
in U.S. monetary variability would cause an appreciation of the exchange 
rate. 
A model of the Eurodollar market was developed in the second section 
of this dissertation. The model followed the portfolio approach and was 
based on the assumptions that the Eurodollar market is a perfectly 
competitive market for international funds, and that Eurodollar banks 
serve as auctioneers of those funds. The model consisted of aggregate 
supply and demand functions for Eurodollar funds, one of which represented 
funds placed in the Eurodollar market by central banks. An instrumental 
variable technique was used to estimate the parameters of the system of 
structural equations that represented the Eurodollar market. The results 
were generally supportive of the portfolio approach. 
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When the estimated parameters were substituted Into a Eurodollar 
Interest rate multiplier equation, the resulting value of the multiplier 
was very low. This implies that the growth of the Eurodollar market 
during the study period was not the result of multiple deposit expansion. 
In addition, it suggests that the Eurodollar market is a source of 
stability within the international monetary system. 
The regression results also indicate that central bank Eurodollar 
holdings respond to interest rates and expectations of future exchange 
rates, but not to the level of official reserves. Some caution must be 
exercised in accepting the results relating to central banks since the 
number of observations on central bank holdings of Eurodollar deposits is 
very limited. 
The study presented in the third section involved an investigation of 
the impact of alternative energy price levels and pollution control 
policies on agricultural production and soil erosion. The study area 
consisted of a two million acre river basin in North Central Iowa. A 
linear programming model was developed to represent crop and livestock 
production in the study area. The programming model was solved for 
various energy price levels and alternative erosion control policies. The 
solution results indicated that higher energy prices alone would Induce a 
switch to agricultural production techniques that are less erosive and 
that require lower levels of fertilizer use. However, the ability of 
higher energy prices to bring about lower levels of nonpoint source 
pollution is limited, given present technology. Substantial reductions in 
soil erosion will occur only as the result of pollution control policies. 
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